



NATIONAL PARKS, INCORPORATED 
SARAH E. LIGHT† 
Public lands and private enterprise exist in an uncomfortable equilibrium. Since 
their founding, the national parks have embraced some forms of private enterprise, 
including privately-run accommodations, to bring members of the public to the parks 
to enjoy and appreciate their beauty. Corporations have provided !nancial support to 
the national parks through philanthropy. And private !rms have bene!tted from 
marketing their associations with the parks. Marketing campaigns that call on the 
feeling of being in the woods and philanthropy to the parks that may bene!t 
corporations by association do not deplete resources or ruin aesthetic experiences like 
a strip mine would. Yet they nonetheless in some fashion dilute the essential publicness 
of the national parks. In debates over the purpose of public lands and the proper role 
of private enterprise within them, relationships between private !rms and public 
lands in which the !rms neither extract commodities from the parks nor physically 
harm them have not received su"cient attention. This Article makes three claims. 
First, as a descriptive matter, it identi!es a set of non-extractive relationships between 
private !rms and national parks as a distinct phenomenon. Second, as a normative 
matter, the Article argues that these relationships deserve greater attention in both 
policy and scholarship because they shed light on important questions about the 
signi!cance of the public in national parks. Finally, as a prescriptive matter, the 
Article concludes that these non-extractive relationships between private !rms and 
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the national parks warrant clearer restrictions in government policy to preserve the 
essential publicness of these lands. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In (*#%, an Advisory Committee to the Department of the Interior made 
several recommendations designed to “improve the quality of National Park 
Service (NPS) facilities:”1 “Our recommendations would allow people to opt 
 
1 Louis Sahagun, Trump Team Has a Plan for National Parks: Amazon, Food Trucks, and No Senior 
Discounts, L.A. TIMES (Nov. &, "#$%, ':## AM), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/"#$%-
$$-#&/trump-administration-privatize-national-parks-tourism [https://perma.cc/Q"PP-DKXK]. 
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for additional costs if they want, for example, Amazon deliveries at a 
particular campsite . . . . We want to let Americans make their own decisions 
in the marketplace.”2 Consistent with this characterization of national parks 
as a marketplace, the Committee noted that “evidence suggests that 
occupancy rates at many campgrounds could grow and additional services, 
from WiFi to utilities, equipment rentals and camp stores” among others 
would “substantially boost net agency revenues, especially when operational 
costs are transferred to private sector partners.”3 In addition, the Committee 
recommended allowing concessioners4 both to make improvements to 
campgrounds and to bene+t +nancially from these improvements.5 The 
prospect of Amazon deliveries and privatized campgrounds led some 
conservation advocates to reject these proposals as a “transfer of public assets 
to private industry.”6 
Public lands and private enterprise have long existed in an uncomfortable 
equilibrium.7 Since the creation of the national parks, the relationship 
between people and these unique public lands has often been mediated and 
facilitated by corporations and other business +rms. In the nineteenth 
century, major railroad companies actively supported the creation of the 
national parks, convinced that these attractions would pull eastern 
populations westward via rail.8 In the statutes creating the national parks, 
Congress speci+cally authorized the provision of accommodations by private 
 
2 See Id. (quoting Derrick Crandall, Vice Chairman, “Made in America” Outdoor Recreation 
Advisory Comm.); see also Juliet Eilperin, Zinke Creates New Outdoor Recreation Panel Made Up Almost 
Entirely of Industry Advisers, WASH. POST (Mar. "(, "#$), !:'! PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/zinke-creates-new-outdoor-recreation-
panel-made-up-entirely-of-industry-advisers/"#$)/#!/"(/#&f!e%(#-"f%a-$$e)-)())-e#'!ba')f$e&_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/!NMY-(*AG] (“Crandall has also endorsed privatization as a way of 
+nancing upgrades to campgrounds such as ready access to WiFi and hot showers, saying that 
current ones ‘lack the amenities sought by today’s campers.’”); cf. Letter from Bill Yeargin, Chair, 
Outdoor Recreation Advisory Comm. & Derrick Crandall, Vice Chair, Outdoor Recreation 
Advisory Comm., to David L. Bernhardt, Sec’y Interior (Oct. $#, "#$%), 
https://www.nps.gov/orgs/$)%"/made-in-america-rac.htm [https://perma.cc/YBZ&-B(VB] 
[hereinafter Transmittal Letter]. Crandall is also the chief executive of the American Recreation 
Coalition. Eilperin, supra. 
3 Transmittal Letter, supra note ", attach. !. 
4 The NPS refers to private entities holding concessions within the parks as “concessioners.” 
'& U.S.C. § $#$%$!. 
5 Transmittal Letter, supra note ", attach. !. 
6 Sahagun, supra note $. On November $, "#$%, shortly after these recommendations were made 
public, the NPS disbanded the Advisory panel, while noting that its recommendations were under 
review. Rob Hotakainen, NPS Scraps Industry-Stacked Advisory Panel, E&E NEWS (Nov. $&, "#$%, 
":!* PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/$#($'&%$"! [https://perma.cc/X"PQ-&WXW]. 
7 See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, $#" GEO. L.J. %%$ ("#$&). 
8 See Michael Mantell, Preservation and Use: Concessions in the National Parks, ) ECOLOGY L.Q. 
$, (-$# ($%*%) (discussing the role of railroads in supporting the creation of the parks “to encourage 
travel on their lines to the West” and their role in establishing hotels and other accommodations). 
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+rms to bring visitors and tourists to enjoy their beauty.9 Indeed, Stephen 
Mather, the +rst director of the National Park Service, observed that 
“[s]cenery is a hollow enjoyment to the tourist who sets out in the morning 
after an indigestible breakfast and a fitful night’s sleep on an impossible bed.”10 
Extractive corporate practices like mining, timbering, and fossil fuel 
development,11 or even less extreme examples like recreational snowmobiling 
 
9 See infra Section III.C. While the purpose of the national and state parks was to set aside 
land for public use and recreation, the concept of who counted as a member of “the public” was not 
always racially inclusive. See Reed Engle, Laboratory for Change, RES. MGMT. NEWSL. (Jan. $%%(), 
reprinted in Segregation and Desegregation at Shenandoah National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct. $", 
"#$)), https://www.nps.gov/articles/segregation-and-desegregation-at-shenandoah.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/ AB!A-FPRX]; Kathryn Miles, Shenandoah National Park Is Confronting Its History, 
OUTSIDE (Sept. "!, "#$%), https://www.outsideonline.com/"&#$'&$/shenandoah-national-park-
segregation-history,close [https://perma.cc/AB!A-FPRX]. Between Reconstruction and World 
War II, the NPS essentially followed local Jim Crow laws and customs in each park, designating and 
constructing separate recreation and picnic facilities, as well as accommodations, for African 
American visitors. See SUSAN SHUMAKER, UNTOLD STORIES FROM AMERICA’S NATIONAL 
PARKS: SEGREGATION IN THE NATIONAL PARKS "$-"" ("##%), http://www.pbs.org 
/nationalparks/media/pdfs/tnp-abi-untold-stories-pt-#$-segregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/'BH(-
M&')] (o-ering a detailed discussion of segregation in the national parks and at national 
monuments). This practice began to change in $%!% in Shenandoah National Park when the NPS 
began to remove o.cial signage indicating segregation by race, and developed an integrated picnic 
ground. Id. at "%-!#. On December &, $%&', Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, issued a 
regulation which prohibited discrimination in the furnishing of public accommodations within the 
parks by the proprietors of any hotels, inns, lodges, or other public accommodations. Discrimination 
in Furnishing Public Accommodations, $# Fed. Reg. $&,)(( (Dec. ), $%&') (codi+ed at !( C.F.R. 
§ ".($). The Supreme Court held segregation of state and local parks to be unconstitutional in $%''. 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, !'# U.S. )** ($%'') (per curiam). However, actual desegregation of 
the parks proceeded more slowly in light of concessioner protests. Shumaker, supra, at !$-!"; Engle, 
supra. For the extensive documentation of the longstanding history of segregation within the state 
parks, many of which were constructed with federal funds during the Great Depression, see 
WILLIAM E. O’BRIEN, LANDSCAPES OF EXCLUSION: STATE PARKS AND JIM CROW IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH ("#$'). The history of segregation has had lasting e-ects. See CAROLYN 
FINNEY, BLACK FACES, WHITE SPACES: REIMAGINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF AFRICAN 
AMERICANS TO THE GREAT OUTDOORS ' ("#$&) (“By excluding the African American 
environmental experience (implicitly or explicitly), corporate, academic, and environmental 
institutions legitimate the invisibility of the African American in the Great Outdoors and in all 
spaces that inform, shape, and control the way we know and interact with the environment in the 
United States.”). 
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-$*-!#", NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: 
CONCESSIONS PROGRAM HAS MADE CHANGES IN SEVERAL AREAS, BUT CHALLENGES 
REMAIN $ ("#$*) (quoting Stephen Mather, Former Director of the Park Service). 
11 Although fossil fuel extraction and mining are widely practiced on public lands in the United 
States, and some legacy claims for mining and extraction remain in the national parks, fossil fuel 
extraction is not a major issue in the national parks. The $%*( Mining in the Parks Act closed the 
national parks to any new mining claims. Pub. L. No. %&-&"%, %# Stat. $!&! (codi+ed at $( U.S.C. 
§ $%#)). However, more than $,### legacy mining claims exist in +fteen of the parks. Mining Claims, 
NAT’L PARK SERV. (Jan. %, "#$*), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/energyminerals/mining-claims.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z(AQ-*ZT%]. Further, according to the NPS, about "## national park units 
contain nonfederal mineral rights claims. Other Energy and Mineral Development, NAT’L PARK SERV. 
(Nov. $(, "#$(), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/energyminerals/mineral-materials.htm 
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tours that are merely noisy,12 physically harm nature and exclude members of 
the public from enjoying these wonders. Some of these activities also 
physically extract commodities from the parks for sale in private markets. 
These activities are core to the notion of private property rights. Indeed, 
many scholars of property law would argue that the right to exclude is the 
sine qua non of private property rights.13 Others have focused on the right to 
destroy.14 Such values associated with private property—exclusion, 
commodi+cation, and destruction—many would argue, have no place in the 
parks, which must remain open to the public.15 
However, not all commercial activity within the parks excludes the public 
or destroys nature. Indeed, many commercial activities like providing 
accommodations and recreational opportunities, corporate philanthropy to 
the parks, and corporate cause-related marketing of associations with the 
parks do not, on their face, appear to cause such physical harm.16 Nor do they 
remove anything tangible from the parks and seek to commercialize or 
commodify it for sale in markets. Marketing campaigns that call on the 
feeling of being in the woods and philanthropy to the parks that may bene+t 
corporations by association do not deplete resources or ruin aesthetic 
experiences like a strip mine would. Some of these corporate activities—like 
 
[https://perma.cc/)LSE-SBPW]. Regulations govern the exercise of nonfederal mineral rights in 
the parks. See !( C.F.R. §§ %.$-%.$), %.!#-%."$# ("#$%) (governing exercise of mineral rights and non-
federal oil and gas rights in the National Park System). However, the Trump administration has 
sought to open more areas of public land to energy extraction. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. $!,*)!, )" 
Fed. Reg. $(,#%! (Mar. !$, "#$*) (directing federal agencies to review regulations that “potentially 
burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources”). 
12 See, e.g., Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, (*& F.!d $""#, $""! ($#th Cir. "#$") (discussing 
history of regulatory action by the NPS with respect to snowmobiles dating back to $%*&, and 
litigation dating back to $%%*); Elizabeth Shogren, !" Years of Wrangling Over Yellowstone Snowmobiles 
Ends, NPR (Oct. "", "#$!, &:!) PM), https://www.npr.org/"#$!/$#/""/"!%*#'($#/new-rules-mean-
more-and-cleaner-snow-mobiles-in-yellowstone [https://perma.cc/FUE!-H*JG]; !( C.F.R. § *.$! 
("#"#) (regulating snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park); !( C.F.R. § *.'& ("#"#) (same in 
Theodore Roosevelt National Park); !( C.F.R. § *.(( (same in North Cascades National Park). 
13 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, ** NEB. L. REV. *!#, *'" ($%%)); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, $$$ YALE 
L.J. !'*, !(#-(& ("##$); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, '! U. CHI. L. REV. *$$, *$$ ($%)(); " WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *" 
(de+ning property as the “sole and despotic dominion . . . over the external things of the world, in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”). 
14 See e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, $$& YALE L.J. *)$ ("##'). 
15 For a discussion of the value of publicness in the parks, see infra Section II.A. 
16 Of course, it is conceivable that an overabundance of accommodations could lead to 
signi+cant congestion that itself could physically harm the parks. See, e.g., Mantell, supra note ), at 
!. But this Article aims to narrow its scope to focus on private corporate activity within the parks 
that does not cause such harm, such as in the cases of a concession for an existing property that does 
not increase the number of hotel rooms, disputes over ownership of the property’s famous name, 
and corporate philanthropy to and cause-related marketing with the parks. 
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philanthropy and cause-related marketing—actually contribute substantially 
to park funding. Likewise, they do the opposite of exclusion—they bring 
members of the public to the parks. Yet even such arguably benign actions 
still raise objections about the proper role of corporations and other private 
actors within the parks. The concern appears to be that these relationships in 
some way dilute the essential publicness of the national parks. Commercial 
activity within the parks that neither physically harms nature nor removes 
physical assets for sale in markets thus focuses a spotlight on essential 
questions about the proper boundary between public and private in the 
national parks, the nature of publicness itself, and the purpose of the parks.17 
This Article therefore seeks to highlight as a distinct phenomenon a set 
of corporate interactions with the national (and in some cases, state) parks 
that are commercial, but non-extractive and not physically harmful. It 
identi+es three case studies of such corporate interactions with the parks as 
examples of this larger phenomenon: (#) corporate concessions within the 
national parks for hotel accommodations; (() corporate claims to ownership 
of the names to historic hotels and other property; and (!) corporate 
philanthropy to and cause-related marketing with national and state parks. 
Each of these forms of interaction raises questions regarding the proper 
balance between public and private when it comes both to ownership and 
pro+t. A recently settled dispute over ownership of the trademarks to the 
historic names of landmarked hotels within Yosemite National Park 
exempli+ed the serious concerns about this boundary.18 Corporate 
philanthropy to and cause-related marketing with both national and state 
parks has led some conservation advocates to worry that these entanglements 
will lead to the renaming of Coca-Cola Yellowstone or Amazon Grand 
Canyon National Park.19 The states have adopted a continuum of approaches 
 
17 For a discussion of the value of publicness in the context of the national parks, see infra 
Section II.B. For a discussion of these issues in the context of urban public spaces, including 
privately owned public open spaces, see Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space, $#! 
IOWA L. REV. $#%!, $$##-#& ("#$)). 
18 Sarah Kaplan, A Private Company Trademarked the Phrase ‘Yosemite National Park.’ Should the 
U.S. Pay to Get It Back?, WASH. POST (Mar. "$, "#$(), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/"#$(/#!/"$/a-private-company-trademarked-the-phrase-yosemite-national-park-should-the-u-s-pay-
to-get-it-back [https://perma.cc/PRT!-!TD(]. 
19 See infra Part II; Lisa Rein, Yosemite, Sponsored by Starbucks? National Parks to Start Selling 
Some Naming Rights, WASH. POST (May %, "#$(, $#:"! AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/powerpost/wp/"#$(/#'/#%/yosemite-national-park-brought-to-you-by-starbucks [https:// 
perma.cc/AFP(-(VMU] (“A Coca-Cola Visitor Center will still be o- limits, but an auditorium at 
Yosemite National Park named after Coke will now be permitted . . . . And parkgoers could sit on a 
bench named for Humana health insurance—and store their food in a bear-proof locker emblazoned 
with the Nike swoosh.”); Joe Davidson, Park Service and Corporate Advertising, a Dangerous Mix, 
WASH. POST (May %, "#$(, *:## AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
powerpost/wp/"#$(/#'/#%/park-service-and-corporate-advertising-a-dangerous-mix 
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to corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing with state parks. At 
the most restrictive end of the spectrum, California requires a nexus between 
the donor +rm’s business and outdoor recreation.20 At the opposite end, 
Tennessee has entered into an agreement with a local brewery that sells “State 
Park Blonde Ale” with an image of the state naturalist on the label, and with 
a portion of the proceeds going to bene+t the Tennessee State Park system.21 
Corporations bene+t from these relationships through direct pro+t (in the 
case of hotel accommodations) and, more indirectly, by building brand 
awareness and improving the broader perception of their brands through a 
“halo e,ect” of association with these beloved national icons.22 These bene+ts 
for the corporations come, in some cases, with corresponding bene+ts to the 
parks in the form of cash or in-kind donations. Indeed, these forms of 
corporate activity o,er an arguable counterpoint to the twin harms of 
exclusion and destruction. They provide lodging for visitors, funding for 
enhanced access for underserved populations, and can fund trail repairs. But 
they can also impose intangible harm on the national parks and their 
reputations. At the very least they raise the risk of “stigma by association”23 
if ever these corporate partners were to su,er an injury to their reputation or 
corporate scandal. And they raise concerns about co-optation of public 
priorities by private interests. Considered together, these interactions require 
a deeper exploration of the proper scope of corporate activity within the 
parks, and how prescriptive the law should be about expanding or limiting 
that role in di,erent contexts. 
These issues are signi+cant. The national parks are big business. A recent 
report by the U.S. Department of the Interior found that national park 
visitors generated -"*.# billion in economic output in (*#&, supporting 
!(%,*** jobs both within the parks themselves, and in surrounding 
communities near national parks, in industries like hotels, restaurants, 
 
[https://perma.cc/*W)T-&NQ)] (“Already parks hoist banners with Budweiser beer and other 
corporate logos. Where will it stop? Can you imagine Disney presents Yellowstone?”). The law 
expressly prohibits the naming of national parks after sponsors. See infra note ")' and accompanying text. 
20 See infra Section III.B.!. 
21 See infra Section III.B.!; State Park Blonde Ale, TENN. BREW WORKS, https://www. 
tnbrew.com/beer/stateparkblonde [https://perma.cc/TMJ"-JLT)]; Christian Spears, Tennessee Brew 
Works Expands Philanthropic E#orts to Tennessee State Parks, CRAFTBEER.COM (Dec. $#, "#$%), 
https://www.craftbeer.com/news/brewery-news/tennessee-brew-works-expands-philanthropic-
e-orts-to-tennessee-state-parks [https://perma.cc/PTT!-!XM*]. 
22 See infra Section IV.A. 
23 Elizabeth Pontikes, Giacomo Negro & Hayagreeva Rao, Stained Red: A Study of Stigma by 
Association to Blacklisted Artists During the “Red Scare” in Hollywood, !$%" to !$&', *' AM. SOCIO. REV. 
&'( ("#$#); Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Kate Odziemkowska & Elizabeth Pontikes, Bad Company: 
Tactics, Stigma, and Shifts in Support for Environmental SMOs after the Horizon Oil Spill (Dec. 
"#$%) (unpublished manuscript) (on +le with author). 
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transportation and recreation.24 That +gure represents a +fty percent increase 
in visitor spending since (*#(.25 According to a Report by the Government 
Accountability O.ce (GAO), in (*#', "&& commercial concessioners within 
the national parks earned total gross revenues of -#." billion, yet paid only 
approximately -#*" million in franchise fees to the NPS.26 In (*#', each of 
the +ve largest concession contracts for lodging, food, and retail services in 
the parks generated more than -'* million in gross revenues.27 With respect 
to corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing, for +scal year (*#&, 
corporations contributed -!#.# million to the parks.28 And while the COVID-
#% pandemic may a,ect these numbers for (*(*, there is no doubt that 
reopening of the national parks during the pandemic has been 
symbolically important.29 
Despite the widespread nature and economic signi+cance of these 
corporate relationships, they have not received sustained attention as such in 
legal scholarship on the national parks. Within the literature on the national 
parks, many scholars have examined the appropriate balance between current 
use and preservation for future generations of these public lands,30 including 
 
24 Press Release, National Park Visitor Spending Contributed /&# Billion to U.S. Economy 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (May "!, "#$%), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/national-park-visitor-
spending-contributed-&#-billion-us-economy [https://perma.cc/NF"J-CEK&]. The Report found 
that “!$) million visitors spend /"#." billion in communities within (# miles” of a national park, and 
that of the !"%,### jobs supported by this economic activity, “more than "(),### jobs” are located 
in “park gateway communities.” Id. 
25 Id. (showing that in "#$", visitors spent /"(.) billion). 
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-$*-!#", NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: 
CONCESSIONS PROGRAM HAS MADE CHANGES IN SEVERAL AREAS, BUT CHALLENGES 
REMAIN & ("#$*). 
27 Id. at '. These contracts were for lodging, food, and retail services in Yosemite, Yellowstone, 
and the Grand Canyon national parks, as well as the Statute of Liberty National Monument and 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. Id. 
28 NAT’L PARK FOUND., "#$) ANNUAL REPORT !) ("#$)), https://www.nationalparks.org/ 
about-foundation/+nancial-reports [https://perma.cc/ZE(J-&J"N]. In addition, individuals and 
family foundations collectively donated a total of /!&.! million to the parks. Id. In "#$), institutional 
foundations contributed /% million and government grants contributed /$#.! million. Id. 
29 Rob Hotakainen, ‘The Parks Are Opening, and Rapidly.’ But It’s Complicated, E&E NEWS 
GREENWIRE (May $&, "#"#), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/$#(!$!'!%% [https://perma.cc/KY(!-
XDX(]. 
30 John Copeland Nagle, How National Park Law Really Works, )( U. COLO. L. REV. )($, )(! 
("#$') (identifying and discussing the ongoing con0ict between “use” and “preservation” as core to 
the Organic Act that created the national parks in $%$(). For discussions about the history and 
purpose of the national parks, see generally MICHAEL FROME, REGREENING THE NATIONAL 
PARKS ($%%"); JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRITICAL HISTORY ($%($); ALFRED 
RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (&th ed. "#$#); JOHN MUIR, OUR 
NATIONAL PARKS (Gibbs Smith "#$)) ($%#$); JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT 
HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS ($%)#); RICHARD WEST SELLARS, 
PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY (copy. "##%). 
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between “quiet” and “noisy” forms of use.31 Some of these debates appear to 
turn, at least in part, on whether the use at issue imposes physical harm. For 
example, whether to permit snowmobiles or e-bikes in the national parks 
raises issues not only of whether noisy or quiet recreation within the parks is 
consistent with their purpose, but also the very practical question of whether 
the addition of mechanized vehicles would harm nature, cause erosion of the 
trails, spook the wildlife, or create noise pollution that would limit the 
enjoyment of those seeking quieter forms of recreation and contemplation.32 
More recent debates have focused on the issue of congestion within the parks 
and how increasing congestion a,ects the use/preservation debate. With 
respect to corporate activity in the parks, several articles have examined the 
law governing concessions within the parks, and one student note has 
examined the trademark dispute between a concessioner and the NPS over 
ownership of the names of historic hotels.33 However, these scholars have not 
identi+ed concessions or the trademark dispute as examples of a broader 
category of corporate activity that is arguably neither exclusionary of the 
public, physically harmful, nor extractive of goods for commercial purposes.34 
Although legal scholars have examined the tax and corporate governance 
consequences of corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing,35 and 
one article has addressed the phenomenon of individual “patriotic 
philanthropy” to government agencies,36 no legal scholarship appears to focus 
 
31 JOSH EAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND POLICY $%( ("#$*); cf. Sarah Krako-, Mountains Without Handrails . . . Wilderness Without 
Cellphones, "* HARV. ENV’T L. REV. &$* ("##!). 
32 Policy Memorandum $%-#$ from Deputy Dir., Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to 
the Reg’l Dirs., Assoc. & Assistant Dirs., Superintendents, and Chief of the U. S. Park Police, Nat’l 
Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Aug. !#, "#$%), https://www.nps.gov/ 
subjects/policy/upload/PM_$%-#$ [https://perma.cc/"P"Q-K)H%] (permitting use of pedal-assist e-
bikes where ordinary bicycles are permitted). 
33 Megan Elaine Ault, Note, This Name Is Your Name: Public Landmarks, Private Trademarks, 
and Our National Parks, (* DUKE L.J. $&' ("#$*) (focusing on using the trademark implications of 
this dispute as a way to preserve the parks from commercial intrusion). 
34 See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in 
the National Park System, *& DENV. L. REV. *"%, *!#, *!& ($%%*) (discussing the origin of the national 
parks and concessions policy through the Concessions Policy Act of $%('); Mantell, supra note ), at 
' (arguing for an “urgent reevaluation by policy makers of concessions management” and focusing 
on heavy visitation encouraged by concessioners as inconsistent with the dual purposes of the parks). 
35 See, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of 
Corporate Philanthropy, && UCLA L. REV. '*% ($%%*); Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related 
Marketing, )' CHI.-KENT L. REV. ))! ("#$#); Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and 
Co-optation, )# FORDHAM L. REV. $))% ("#$"). 
36 Margaret H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Patriotic Philanthropy? Financing the State with 
Gifts to Government, $#( CALIF. L. REV. $$"%, $$'*, $$(', $$*# ("#$)) (discussing philanthropy by 
wealthy individuals and foundations like the Gates Foundation for pet projects in education, health 
care, and other contexts, but not focusing on corporate philanthropy to national or state parks). For 
more on the term “patriotic philanthropy,” see id. at $$!" (citing Eleanor Clift, Patriotic Philanthropy: 
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squarely on these issues in the context of corporations and the national (and 
state) parks or as an example of this larger phenomenon. 
Holly Doremus has come the closest to this issue, o,ering an in-depth 
account of corporate “bioprospecting” in Yosemite’s hot springs for biological 
substances with potential medical uses.37 Doremus contends that while 
bioprospecting is done at such a small scale as to avoid physically harming the 
park, it nonetheless interferes with the park’s purpose to inspire wonder and 
awe.38 While the bioprospecting project that Doremus discussed may not 
have physically harmed the parks, bioprospecting nonetheless extracts 
something physical from them for commercial bene+t and commodi+cation, 
even if the thing that is commodi+ed is very small. 
This Article therefore advances the literature by isolating the question of 
whether corporate activity within the national parks poses concerns about a 
loss of publicness that warrant policy responses, even if that corporate activity 
does not exclude the public, commoditize a natural asset within the parks, or 
physically harm nature. Marketing campaigns that call on the feeling of being 
in the woods do not deplete resources or ruin aesthetic experience like fossil 
fuel extraction does. Private ownership of a trademark to the name of a 
historic hotel in Yosemite National Park does not exclude anyone from 
staying at the hotel; nor does it otherwise implicate stewardship of the land 
for future generations. 
In other words, these non-extractive corporate relationships with the 
parks do not “use” the land or interfere with “preservation” of its resources 
in ways that implicate traditional debates over “use” versus “preservation.” 
Nor do they commodify goods within the parks in the traditional sense by 
removing or allowing the removal for commercial bene+t of timber, fossil 
 
Not an Oxymoron, DAILY BEAST (Nov. "*, "#$&, ':'& AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/patriotic-
philanthropy-not-an-oxymoron [https://perma.cc/*ZAS-B'TM]; Sophie Gilbert, David Rubenstein’s 
Patriotic Philanthropy, ATLANTIC (Oct. "%, "#$&), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/ 
"#$&/$#/david-rubensteins-patriotic-philanthropy/!)"#)"/ [https://perma.cc/DMD%-RN(P]). 
37 Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge and Pro(t: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy and 
the Core Purposes of America’s National Parks, "( ECOLOGY L.Q. &#$, &#!-#& ($%%%) (identifying the 
phenomenon of “bioprospecting,” in which biotechnology companies seek to discover useful 
microorganisms for commercialization). 
38 Id. at &#& (noting that this process leads to “no detectable physical or biological impact on 
the park”). In the context of bioprospecting, Doremus contends that the national parks are about 
more than their physical resources: 
The symbolism of the national parks is nearly as important to the nation 
as the natural resources they harbor. The fundamental purpose of the national 
parks is not merely to preserve nature. They should also inspire the populace 
with wonder, awe and fascination of nature, express the nation’s respect for its 
natural wonders, and make those wonders available to all on an equal basis. 
Id. at &#(. Thus, she o-ers a Kantian critique of bioprospecting, contending that even when physical 
harm is not at issue, there remains a concern about preserving the parks’ “inspirational and 
expressive functions.” Id. at &#*. 
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fuels, or biological substances. The parks themselves remain open to the 
public and no one is excluded from their use and enjoyment. Yet these 
corporate actions appear to work some kind of mischief—they are 
commodi+cation in a di,erent form.39 They are still somehow disaggregating 
the bundle of public goods and values—including public goodwill—
associated with public lands, just in a di,erent way from extractive industries. 
This Article o,ers both a descriptive account of these non-extractive 
corporate interactions with the parks, and a normative account of what these 
relationships tell us about the nature of publicness in the national parks. 
Finally, it o,ers a set of prescriptions for the role that corporations ought to 
play within these public lands. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I o,ers a brief primer on the 
creation of the National Park System in the United States and introduces the 
traditional debate between preservationists and conservationists over the 
purpose of the parks. Part II examines the question of why the parks ought 
to be public at all. It +rst o,ers a normative account of publicness that 
embraces both the values to individuals and to the nation as a whole of 
commitments to public lands. It then takes a deep dive into the origin of the 
parks that focuses on concerns about preserving the parks’ publicness against 
private and corporate encroachment. This Part concludes with the 
observation that the statutes creating the parks accepted at least some role for 
private enterprise, most notably concessions for accommodations. Part III 
examines two more contemporary cases studies: a recent dispute over 
ownership of trademarks to landmarked properties, and corporate 
philanthropy/cause-related marketing of associations with the parks. Part IV 
o,ers a normative assessment of the bene+ts of such interactions to 
corporations and potential bene+ts and harms to the parks, drawing on social 
science literature about corporate social responsibility. Finally, this Article 
concludes in Part V by arguing that the law governing the parks should be 
most concerned about exclusion, commodi+cation of natural assets, and 
physical destruction. Yet the more intangible, associational harms identi+ed 
here still demand caution and warrant more proactive policy responses. 
I. CONSERVATION, PRESERVATION, AND THE NATIONAL PARKS 
The history of the creation of the national parks is intertwined with the 
normative question of why land ought to be set aside for public use in the 
 
39 For a broad discussion of commodi+cation, see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, $## HARV. L. REV. $)&% ($%)*). In Radin’s account, “[s]omething that is market-
inalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system means it is not to be traded in the 
market.” Id. at $)'#. In other words, certain goods ought not be commoditized. 
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+rst place—a question that continues to have many, sometimes con/icting, 
answers. This Part focuses on the legal basis for creating the parks, and the 
debate between conservationists and preservationists over their purpose—
whether the land should be used most e.ciently subject to the limitation of 
preservation for future generations, or whether the space should be preserved 
in its natural state to inspire wonder and awe. 
Article IV, Section !, Clause ( of the Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to designate and make laws regarding public lands, stating that 
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”40 The 
Supreme Court has held that this power is “without limitations,”41 and has 
interpreted it to include the authority to adopt appropriate rules governing 
safety and use of public lands, for example to protect wildlife.42 
But why set aside land as national “parks” for public use at all?43 Legal 
scholars, philosophers, and naturalists, among others, have long debated the 
value or values that the national parks should promote.44 Two primary 
approaches have dominated this discussion: preservation and conservation. 
Preservationists argue that public lands should be preserved in their natural 
state as spaces of inspiration and contemplation in which people can achieve 
 
40 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § !, cl. ". 
41 United States v. City of San Francisco, !$# U.S. $(, "%-!# ($%&#) (holding that Congress may 
expand or limit the public domain “to avoid monopoly and to bring about a widespread distribution 
of bene+ts”). 
42 Kleppe v. New Mexico, &"( U.S. '"%, '&$ ($%*(). 
43 Other forms of public land in the United States, including National Forests managed by the 
U.S. Forest Service, National Wildlife Refuges managed by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and 
National Conservation Areas managed by the Bureau of Land Management have di-erent purposes. 
America’s Public Lands Explained, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BLOG (June $!, "#$(), 
https://www.doi.gov/blog/americas-public-lands-explained [https://perma.cc/RR)H-QR!&]. These 
various forms of public land display a “structured normative pluralism. [Public-lands law] integrates 
a range of competing values: privatization and extraction; motorized recreation and hunting; scenic 
preservation, hiking, and solitude; and ecological preservation and biodiversity.” Jedediah Britton-
Purdy, Whose Lands? Which Public? The Shape of Public-Lands Law and Trump’s National Monument 
Proclamations, &' ECOLOGY L.Q. %"$, %!%, %&)-&% ("#$)) (noting the strong presumption in the law 
against presidential privatization of public lands to avoid corruption). For a sweeping theoretical 
discussion of how the concept of “nature” has evolved as a form of democratic self-governance 
throughout American history, see Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, 
Environmental Law, and Democracy, $$% YALE L.J. $$"" ("#$#). The focus of this Article, however, is 
the national (and state) parks, which embody a “far narrower range of potential uses” than other 
forms of public land. Britton-Purdy, supra, at %&". The most limited form of public land management 
is set forth in the Wilderness Act, which mandates the preservation of the lands’ “wilderness 
character” by permitting only “solitude” and “primitive and uncon+ned types of recreation.” Id. at 
%&! (citing $( U.S.C. § $$!$). 
44 See supra note !#. 
(*(*] National Parks, Incorporated "' 
transcendence and separation from their daily lives.45 This preservationist 
approach is embodied in the life work of co-founder of the Sierra Club John 
Muir,46 and landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead.47 Muir and the 
preservationists were in/uenced by “Romantic and Transcendentalist 
aesthetics” that valued “certain kinds of aesthetic and spiritual experience” 
that could be found only in “spectacular natural settings” like the parks.48 This 
preservationist approach contrasts with that of the conservationists.49 
Conservationists, including Gi,ord Pinchot, the +rst head of the U.S. Forest 
Service, instead contended that public lands should be actively managed by 
experts to promote their best and most e.cient use—a utilitarian approach—
subject to the limitation that the land is conserved for the bene+t of future 
generations.50 Thus, at the time of the parks’ creation, the conservation 
approach was consistent with some substantial commercial use of public 
lands, though in highly regulated form.51 And while there were signi+cant 
limits on what forms of commercial use could occur within the national parks, 
 
45 MUIR, supra note !#; Doremus, supra note !*. 
46 See MUIR, supra note !#; JOHN MUIR, THE YOSEMITE ($%$"); JOHN MUIR, NATURE 
WRITINGS (William Cronon ed., $%%*). 
47 See infra notes $#(–$$! and accompanying text. 
48 Purdy, supra note &!, at $$!%. Notably, as with the racially exclusionary history of the national 
parks themselves, the Sierra Club has recently acknowledged John Muir’s racism and attitudes 
toward people of color. The Sierra Club itself excluded people of color from membership, much as 
the parks themselves excluded people of color in the Jim Crow South. Michael Brune, Pulling Down 
Our Monuments, SIERRA CLUB (July "", "#"#), https://www.sierraclub.org/michael-
brune/"#"#/#*/john-muir-early-history-sierra-club [https://perma.cc/NS%W-NHGU] (noting that 
Muir’s harmful racist words and promotion of stereotypes “continue to hurt and alienate Indigenous 
people and people of color who come into contact with the Sierra Club”). Thus, it is important to 
take with a grain of salt sweeping pronouncements by the parks’ founders about the importance of 
making these lands open to “the public.” 
49 Of course, the idea that nature serves as a place to inspire wonder and awe in the human 
imagination—an idea embraced by preservationists—cannot be characterized as insensitive to 
consequences or as fully non-instrumental in nature. 
50 For example, Pinchot unsuccessfully sought to place the parks under the management of the 
Forest Service; however, Stephen Mather, the +rst Director of the Park Service succeeded in arguing 
that the “Forest Service’s mission of commercial exploitation of natural resources would destroy the 
parks.” Doremus, supra note !*, at &*# (citing SELLARS, supra note !#, at ')). Of course, this debate 
completely sidesteps the question of who the land belonged to before it was set aside for “public” 
use. O-ering an account based in critical ethnic studies, environmental justice, and critical 
geography, Sarah Krako- extensively examines this question as it relates to the Native nations who 
were dispossessed of these lands. Sarah Krako-, Not Yet America’s Best Idea: Law, Inequality, and 
Grand Canyon National Park, %$ U. COLO. L. REV. ''% ("#"#). For an in-depth history of the 
conservation movement in the United States, see generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND 
THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, $)%#-$%"# 
(Univ. of Pittsburgh Press $%%%) ($%'%). 
51 See generally HAYS, supra note '# (discussing promotion by conservationists like Pinchot of 
commercial use with regulation in contexts of water power rights, mineral extraction, grazing, and timbering, 
among others). 
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Pinchot strongly believed that even the parks should be open to e.cient 
management.52 
The debate between these two perspectives was perhaps best embodied in 
a dispute in the early twentieth century between Muir and Pinchot regarding 
whether a river /owing through the Hetch Hetchy Valley ought to be 
dammed to provide water to the City of San Francisco.53 The river lay within 
what had been designated by Congress as Yosemite National Park. A dam 
would /ood the Valley, destroying the ability of the public to enjoy its 
splendor. Pinchot argued that the bene+ts to San Francisco were signi+cant 
and outweighed any interest in leaving the river and Valley in their natural 
state.54 Muir rejected this utilitarian approach, contending that it was 
equivalent to damming “the people’s cathedrals and churches, for no holier 
temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man.”55 In his view, any 
exploitation of natural resources for instrumental bene+t was dangerous and 
would lead down a slippery slope.56 In #%#!, Congress gave the victory to 
Pinchot’s approach when it passed the Raker Act and granted to the City of 
San Francisco a right of way “in, over, and through” the land in Yosemite 
National Park to dam the river.57 By #%(!, the dam was in place and the 
Valley flooded.58 
This controversy highlighted the distinction between conservation and 
preservation. However, the dispute was not about commercial use. Rather, 
the debate over Hetch Hetchy exposed the tradeo,s between two forms of 
public interest: that of preserving the park in its natural splendor, and that of 
the City of San Francisco in its need for water for its population.59 
While unsuccessful in stopping the construction of the dam, Muir’s 
position favoring preservation prevailed in some signi+cant ways thereafter. 
Three years after passing the Raker Act, in #%#$, Congress passed the Organic 
Act that created the National Park System and the National Park Service 
(NPS).60 The Act’s statement of purpose declared that the NPS shall 
promote and regulate the use o! the Federal areas known as national parks, 
monuments, and reservations hereinafter speci"ed by such means and 
measures as conform to the fundamental purposes o! the said parks, 
 
52 Id. 
53 RUNTE, supra note !#, at *)-%'; HAYS, supra note '#, at $%"-%*. 
54 RUNTE, supra note !#, at *)-%'. 
55 JOHN MUIR, Hetch Hetchy Valley, in JOHN MUIR, NATURE WRITINGS )$#, )$* 
(William Cronon ed., $%%*). 
56 Doremus, supra note !*, &&# n."#$. 
57 Act of Dec. $%, $%$!, Pub. L. (!-&$, § $, !) Stat. "&", "&". 
58 RUNTE, supra note !#, at *)-%'. 
59 HAYS, supra note '#, at $%! (“[C]on0ict between two public uses of the Valley was the crux 
of the controversy”). 
60 Act of Aug. "', $%$(, Pub. L. (&-"!', § $, !% Stat. '!', '!'. 
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monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and 
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for 
the enjoyment o! the same in such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment o# future generations.61 
Thus, the Organic Act stated that the purpose of the parks was both 
preservation of the scenery and natural wonders for future generations and 
enjoyment of those wonders in the present. The Act created the NPS as a 
distinct entity within the Department of the Interior. This decision to situate 
the new NPS outside of the U.S. Forest Service that Pinchot controlled 
according to utilitarian/conservationist principles took place over Pinchot’s 
strenuous objections.62 By designating both preservation and current 
enjoyment as goals—goals that are sometimes in con/ict—the Act left a 
signi+cant degree of discretion to the new NPS to determine how to balance 
among those competing considerations.63 
This debate over the purpose of the parks continues to the present day. 
With minor modi+cations, this dual purpose of conservation “for the 
enjoyment of future generations” and providing “for enjoyment” in the 
present remains in the current statutory language.64 This language speaks to 
the tension between the present and the future. It has generated serious 
debate for over one hundred years as to the appropriate balance between these 
two interests.65 
To highlight just one example of the ongoing importance of what has 
come to be known as the use/preservation debate, Holly Doremus has 
discussed whether the NPS should enter into agreements with private +rms 
to permit “bioprospecting” in the thermal pools of Yosemite.66 Doremus has 
 
61 Id. (emphasis added); see Nagle, supra note !#, at )("-(! ("#$') (citing this as language 
authored by Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr., son of Frederick Law Olmstead, the American landscape 
architect who designed Central Park); see also National Park Service: Hearing on H.R. %)% & H.R. 
*&&* Before the H. Comm. on Pub. Lands, (&th Cong. '", '" ($%$() (statement of J. Horace McFarland, 
President, American Civic Associations) (stating that Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. “framed” this 
sentence of the Organic Act, and that the “fundamental thing that was in mind at the time was to 
be sure that there should be in the bill . . . a statement of what the parks were for”). 
62 See supra note (#; HAYS, supra note '!, at $%'-%*. 
63 Nagle, supra note !#, at )(*-%#. Use con0icts in the environmental law context are not unique 
to the national parks. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Con+icts, and Neutral 
Baselines in Environmental Law, (# DUKE L.J. $'#' ("#$$). 
64 '& U.S.C. § $##$#$ (“The Secretary . . . shall promote and regulate the use of the National Park 
System by means and measures that conform to the fundamental purpose of the System units, which 
purpose is to conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System units and 
to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in such manner 
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”). 
65 Nagle, supra note !#, at )(!-(' (documenting examples of the use/preservation debate and 
observing that the NPS retains significant discretion to balance among these sometimes conflicting goals). 
66 Doremus, supra note !*, at &#(. 
"& University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. #$%: !! 
argued that the purpose of the parks includes preserving their symbolism and 
capacity to inspire awe.67 Doremus thus o,ers a modern preservationist, 
Kantian vision of what kinds of scienti+c research should be permitted within 
the parks. She contends that “appreciative science”—a form of scienti+c 
research that has as its intent the understanding of nature—is permissible.68 
However, “instrumental science”—a form of research experimentation that 
sends the message that “nature has value not in itself, but only as a means 
toward human ends”—has no place in the parks and is “not the message parks 
should communicate.”69 She notes that the “contrast between the 
instrumental and appreciative scienti+c traditions closely parallels that 
between Gi,ord Pinchot’s conservationist and John Muir’s preservationist 
views of the function of parklands.”70 Thus, bioprospecting implicates the 
use/preservation distinction that frames many debates over the purpose of 
the parks. 
But the use/preservation distinction does not fully capture concerns 
regarding the role of private commercial activity within the parks. Individuals 
and non-pro+t organizations can “use” or seek to “preserve” the parks just as 
corporations can. A non-pro+t university or hospital could seek to engage in 
bioprospecting instead of a commercial +rm for the purpose of +nding life-
saving medicine rather than for the purpose of “understanding nature”. 
Individuals can participate in “noisy” forms of recreation that interfere with 
preservation for future generations or “quiet” forms of enjoyment that do not 
cause harm. And private corporations can interact with the parks in ways that 
do not exclude members of the public, that impose no physical harm on the 
parks, and that do not physically extract any goods. In other words, 
corporations can interact with the parks in ways that do not implicate either 
“use” or “preservation” in the traditional senses. 
The next Part turns to the question of why we value publicness in the 
parks, and then o,ers a more detailed origin story of the parks that 
speci+cally highlights early and ongoing concerns about the role of private 
commercial enterprise. 
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THE PARKS 
The tension over the appropriate balance between use and preservation 
was not the only signi+cant debate as the parks were being created. Indeed, 
 
67 Id. at &#(-#*. While the bioprospecting agreement suggested that the practice would not 
physically harm the park, it would still remove certain natural compounds from the thermal pools 
for testing and, potentially, for commercial sale. Id. at &#*-$#. 
68 Id. at &'). 
69 Id. at &'%. 
70 Id. 
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there were explicit debates about why the parks should be public, concerns 
about encroachment of private interests, and acknowledgement that some 
role for private enterprise could be appropriate. This Part +rst o,ers a 
normative and theoretical account of the value of publicness in the national 
parks. It then o,ers a more nuanced historical narrative about the creation of 
the parks that focuses on the public-private boundary. The designation of the 
parks was bound up with a distinct set of worries about how private property 
could lead to the exclusion of members of the public from the enjoyment of 
these natural wonders, commodi+cation of the wonders themselves, and 
destruction of nature. And the story is intertwined with the creation of our 
collective national identity. 
A. The Value of Publicness in the Parks 
This discussion of the origin of the parks and their uneasy relationship 
between public and private raises a foundational question: what is the value 
of public space being public, rather than private? And in this speci+c context, 
why do we value public national parks, when there are other potential ways to 
enjoy nature? One alternative, for example, could include large parks owned 
by a private but generous individual or corporation, to which the public has 
access.71 This Article takes a pluralistic approach to the value of publicness in 
the parks, acknowledging many di,erent values that have evolved over time. 
Most importantly, these values include not only those of importance to 
individuals but also collective value to the community and nation as a whole. 
Scholars have o,ered accounts of the values that public spaces provide in 
many contexts. For example, with respect to urban public spaces like town 
squares, local parks, and sidewalks, Sarah Schindler has argued that such 
spaces are valuable as public spaces rather than private ones because they 
“foster[] interaction between people with diverse viewpoints and from 
di,erent socio-economic backgrounds,” “nurture democratic values” by 
providing spaces to assemble and speak, a,ord people a “third place” beyond 
 
71 There may be some forms of private property that guarantee bene+ts to the public into the 
future, such as private trusts, conservation easements, and other covenants that run with the lands 
to preserve them in perpetuity. See generally Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural 
Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, !& HARV. ENV’T L. REV. $$% ("#$#) 
(discussing concerns about fraud and ine.ciency in conservation easements and private land trusts 
and recommending reforms). Yet these private mechanisms of conservation did not come into 
widespread use until the $%'#s. And while they are creative, they have been criticized as ine.cient 
and subject to fraud and abuse. Id. Indeed, the +rst conservation easement in the $))#s served to 
protect “Frederick Law Olmstead’s Boston parkways,” and the NPS used easements in the $%!#s to 
“protect its parkways as well.” Id. at $"*. Notably, these early easements were held by public entities, 
not private ones. Id. at $"( (“Until the $%'#s, conservation easements were used only sporadically 
and were held exclusively by governmental organizations.”). 
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home and work to interact, and create spaces “for those with nowhere else to 
go” like the homeless.72 While some of these values may have purchase in the 
parks context, national parks are not like the local town square that provides 
a public forum for public speeches, nor are they necessarily havens for the homeless. 
As the following historical narrative demonstrates, the founders of the 
parks valued their publicness explicitly because it could limit the potential 
harms associated with private ownership of property—including the potential 
for destruction of natural resources, exclusion of anyone from enjoying of 
their beauty, and commodi+cation of goods for pro+t. By virtue of the parks’ 
publicness, all members of the public—at least in an ideal world, if not the 
world in which the parks originated—ought to be welcome to enjoy their 
beauty and splendor, from the richest to the poorest in the nation.73 The 
parks’ public nature—the fact that governments hold them in trust for the 
public interest—would ensure that they will not be destroyed or carved up 
into pieces. Their publicness would guarantee that members of the public of 
limited means could not be charged fees or tolls to enjoy their splendor. 
Rather, these awe-inspiring places would be preserved both for the enjoyment 
of today, and for the bene+t of future generations.74 
The bene+ts noted thus far can be styled as bene+ts to individuals—the 
ability of anyone, of any means, to enjoy these spectacular places and be 
inspired with awe and wonder. But the mere fact that individuals can have 
these experiences is not in and of itself the sole explanation for the parks’ 
publicness. Their publicness is intimately bound up with the identity of the 
nation as a whole. The historical records bear this out. It is therefore worth 
pausing to examine how the publicness of the parks a,ords bene+ts both to 
individuals and to the community or collective, including the nation.75 
Carol Rose has identi+ed two features of property that lead to a 
presumption of “publicness” rather than private ownership of speci+c 
categories of property: the holdout problem and the notion that property is 
more valuable when more people in a community use it.76 Each of these 
rationales arguably applies to the national parks. The “holdout” problem is 
the risk that a private owner could block access, charge fees to members of 
 
72 Schindler, supra note $*, at $$#$ (citations omitted). 
73 See notes $$$-$$" and accompanying text (discussing Muir’s lament that only the wealthy 
could a-ord access to natural wondrous spaces in the country). But see supra note % (discussing the 
history of racial exclusion within national and state parks). 
74 See supra notes !) and '# and accompanying text. 
75 The notion of the parks’ bene+ts to the nation as a whole, and the relationship between 
public lands and the creation of the nation are most notably associated with the words and actions 
of President Theodore Roosevelt. See infra Section II.C. 
76 Rose, supra note $!, at *($. Such properties include roadways, navigable waters, and beaches, 
and their public nature has at times precluded e-orts of individuals, but at times even of the 
legislature, to dispose of or privatize them. 
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the public, or otherwise prevent members of the public from using a property 
that is needed for some public purpose.77 Thus, the anti-holdout rationale for 
designating property as public applies when the property is “physically 
capable of monopolization by private persons.”78 A classic example would be 
when the government seeks to build a road, and sets about purchasing 
individual lots needed for the best route. One holdout along the route could 
stymie the whole project. Accordingly, the holdout problem has been o,ered 
as a rationale for the government’s power of eminent domain to take private 
property for public use.79 The holdout problem is consistent with the twin 
concerns about exclusion and destruction and would certainly apply both to 
individuals and to the community more broadly. While Rose describes the 
holdout problem as a necessary condition for publicness, she nonetheless 
regards it as insu.cient on its own. 
The second characteristic necessary for publicness is also signi+cant in the 
context of the national parks. That condition is the fact that “a property will 
be more valuable if open to public access than it would be under exclusive 
private control” because the more people that use it, the more enjoyment is 
generated.80 For example, English custom allowed communities to hold 
maypole dances on private property over a landowner’s objection. On this 
custom Rose observed: “Activities of this sort may have value precisely 
because they reinforce the solidarity and fellow-feeling of the whole community; thus 
the more members of the community who participate, even if only as 
observers, the better for all.”81 
Rose refers to these activities that require lands to be public as a “comedy 
of the commons” rather than a “tragedy of the commons.”82 The oft-described 
tragedy of the commons involves a situation in which increased use by 
individuals without some form of governance leads to depletion of a resource, 
the classic example being open grazing land.83 In contrast, in a comedy of the 
commons, public use of land generates greater enjoyment when more 
members of the community participate; in Rose’s words, “the more the 
merrier.”84 Only such broad community participation can generate solidarity 
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at *(", **&. 
79 Id. at *&%-'#, *($. 
80 Id. at *($, **& (noting that Calabresi and Melamed observed that “use of eminent domain to 
overcome holdout presumes that property taken is more valuable for governmental purpose than in 
hands of former owners” (citing Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, )' HARV. L. REV. $#)%, $$#(-#* ($%*"))). 
81 Rose, supra note $!, at *(*-() (emphasis added). 
82 Id. at *(). In economic terms, Rose refers to these as “scale returns—greater value with greater 
participation.” Id; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, $(" SCIENCE $"&! ($%()). 
83 See generally Hardin, supra note )". 
84 Rose, supra note $!, at *(*-(). 
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and “fellow-feeling.”85 Rose uses this insight to explain why doctrines about 
“inherent publicness” applied to channels of commerce like roads and 
waterways, which were needed because “commerce requires the interaction of 
persons.”86 But property necessary for commerce is not the only context in 
which this need for solidarity and fellow-feeling arises. As Rose notes, this 
second characteristic may be especially true of “unique” properties87—a 
category into which national parks would certainly +t in light of their unique 
aesthetic beauty.88 
Other scholars have similarly identi+ed the collective value of public 
goods in the context of public lands. For example, Joseph Sax refers to the 
concept of a “bandwagon e,ect” in which “the value of something to any 
given individual is itself dependent on whether it has value to others.”89 Eric 
Orts and Amy Sepinwall seek to distinguish “collective goods” from the more 
well-known economic concept of public goods,90 in which shared enjoyment 
of collective resources warrants a di,erent analysis than the ordinary 
normative arguments for and against commodification of individual resources.91 
To apply these normative frameworks to the national parks, in one 
important sense, it is their open access to all—their collectiveness—that 
reinforces their value to the nation. This publicness expresses something—it 
speaks of a nation’s commitment to certain values.92 According to Sax, 
 
85 Id. President Theodore Roosevelt, who played a crucial role in setting aside millions of acres 
of public lands in the early twentieth century, spoke of the creation of “fellow-feeling” to describe 
why public lands are needed. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Fellow-Feeling as a Political Factor, 
CENTURY, Jan. $%##, reprinted in THE STRENUOUS LIFE (', *$ ($%#") (“[T]he fact remains that the 
only true solution of our political and social problems lies in cultivating everywhere the spirit of 
brotherhood, of fellow-feeling, and understanding between man and man, and the willingness to 
treat a man as a man, which are the essential factors in American democracy as we still see it in the 
country districts.”). 
86 Rose, supra note $!, at **# (“In an odd Lockeanism, the public deserved access to these 
properties, because ‘publicness,’ nonexclusive open access, created their highest value.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
87 Id. at *($. 
88 Id. at **&. 
89 See Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, ') WASH. U. L. REV. &)$, 
&)( ($%)!) (“Some of the value of such things doubtless lies in their capacity to stimulate feelings 
of national identity or cultural solidarity, and their value to any individual rises as they are embraced 
by the entire community as public values.”). 
90 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, !( REV. ECON. & STAT. !)*, 
!)*-)% ($%'&) (identifying that public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous). 
91 See Eric W. Orts & Amy J. Sepinwall, Collective Goods and the Court: A Theory of Constitutional 
Commodi(cation, %* WASH. U. L. REV. (!*, (!% ("#"#) (“Collective goods cannot be bought or sold 
without destroying their essential nature. For example, to divide a national park such as Yosemite 
into parcels of real estate would destroy its value as a collective good meant for the enjoyment of all 
citizens in perpetuity.”). 
92 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, $&& U. PA. L. REV. "#"$, "#"" ($%%'). 
(*(*] National Parks, Incorporated '! 
wilderness has this quality.93 While an individual hiker derives value from 
visiting wild public lands personally, that hiker “may also derive some bene+ts 
from wilderness or historic preservation in some remote areas [they] will 
never use or see, arising from the commitment of Americans to preserve wilderness 
as a community value.”94 To put it succinctly: 
A commitment to wilderness (or to symbols of America’s historic greatness) 
yields such value to any given individual only if the community as a whole 
treats it as important. And in such cases the evidence of such value is an act 
of commitment by the whole community, such as embracing the national 
policy of historic preservation, wilderness, the $ag or any of a host of symbols 
of national character or identity.95 
 
Indeed, economists have demonstrated that people benefit merely from 
knowing that such beautiful natural places exist, even if they do not use them.96 
When we speak of the value of publicness of the parks therefore, it is 
essential to speak not only of bene+ts to individuals, but also to the broader 
community and nation as a whole. Designation of these spaces as public 
expresses the nation’s commitment to the ideas that public lands must be 
preserved from certain forms of private economic activity. It likewise 
expresses the commitment that individuals of all means are entitled to share 
in experiencing the bounties of the nation’s beauty without needing to seek 
permission from wealthy individuals or corporations that could a,ord to set 
aside such lands without government intervention. 
In a related context, the Supreme Court has observed that maintenance 
of national monuments at public expense is an essential element that facilitates 
their appreciation by ordinary citizens.97 In the case of United States v. 
Gettysburg Electric Railroad Company, the Supreme Court was called upon to 
determine the legitimacy of an act of Congress that condemned land to create 
memorials at the Gettysburg battle+eld site, including whether the taking 
was for a “public purpose.”98 In upholding the act of Congress over the 
objection of a railroad whose land was taken for that purpose, the court wrote: 
“Here upon this battle+eld is one of the proofs of that expenditure, and the 
 
93 Sax, supra note )%, at &)(-)*. 
94 Id. at &)(. 
95 Id. 
96 Carolyn Kousky & Sarah E. Light, Insuring Nature, (% DUKE L.J. !"!, !"' ("#$%). Such value 
is referred to as “non-use value.” Id. at !!& (de+ning non-use values to include the “value of 
preserving an ecosystem as part of a community’s cultural heritage, or the value that people derive 
simply from knowing that a particular species continues to exist”). 
97 United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., $(# U.S. ((), ()"-)! ($)%(); see also Rose, supra note 
$!, at *** & n.!#% (citing Gettysburg Electric Railroad on this point). 
98 Gettysburg Elec. Ry., $(# U.S. at ((%-*$, (*). 
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sacri+ces are rendered more obvious and more easily appreciated when such 
a battle+eld is preserved by the government at the public expense.”99 
In other words, a commemoration at Gettysburg would not have been as 
meaningful if a private wealthy individual or corporation purchased the land 
at market value, conducted surveys to understand the history of the battle, 
and erected monuments to remember the acts that occurred on the battle+eld. 
The commitment of public resources expresses the fact that what is being set 
aside is something of value to the nation as a whole. For the national parks, 
such public commitments have borne fruit in the American consciousness. 
The national parks have been referred to as America’s “best idea”100 and are a 
source of national pride and public goodwill for the nation as a whole. 
B. Protecting the Public from the Private 
With this normative account in mind, it is now worth revisiting the story 
of the creation of the national parks to focus on the speci+c ways in which the 
founders of the parks sought to separate public from private. Going back in 
time to before the consolidation of the parks under the NPS in #%#$ more 
fully reveals early concerns about the role of private commercial enterprise 
and the role these concerns played in the setting aside of public lands to create 
these parks. 
Congress and the states had begun to designate discrete tracts of land 
across the United States for public use and recreation beginning in the early 
nineteenth century. In #&!(, Congress enacted legislation designating Hot 
Springs Reservation (now Hot Springs National Park) as public land to be 
“reserved for the future disposal of the United States.”101 The legislation 
declared that the land “shall not be entered, located, or appropriated, for any 
other purpose whatever.”102 While this was the +rst federal reservation of land 
along these lines, Congress only o.cially designated Hot Springs as a 
 
99 Id. at ()"-)!. 
100 See Famous Quotes Concerning the National Parks, NAT’L PARK SERV. (last updated Jan. $(, 
"##!, $#:'" PM), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/hisnps/NPSThinking/famousquotes.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z&&E-(ULE] (“National parks are the best idea we ever had. Absolutely 
American, absolutely democratic, they re0ect us at our best rather than our worst.” (quoting Wallace 
Stegner, $%)!)). 
101 Act of April "#, $)!", ch. *#, & Stat. '#'. See generally Hot Springs National Park: History & 
Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV. (last updated Sept. "&, "#"#), https://www.nps.gov/hosp/ 
learn/historyculture/index.htm [https://perma.cc/*M&&-BRE']; Sharon Shugart, Hot Springs 
National Park: A Brief History of the Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. HIST. ELIBRARY (Nov. "##!), 
http://www.npshistory.com/publications/hosp/bathhouse-row-brief-history.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V(C%-QHL"]. 
102 & Stat. at '#'. 
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National Park in #%(#, several years after the creation of the National 
Park System.103 
The origin story continues in California. In #&$", Congress deeded 
speci+c tracts of land in the Yosemite Valley—which ultimately became part 
of Yosemite National Park—to the State of California to be managed as a 
public trust.104 Yosemite’s origin informs today’s debates over the appropriate 
dividing line between public and private in the parks and thus warrants 
detailed discussion. The #&$" grant to California explicitly underscored the 
park’s purpose stating that the State “shall accept this grant upon the express 
condition that the premises shall be held for public use, resort, and recreation; 
shall be inalienable for all time; but leases not exceeding ten years may be 
granted for portions of said premises.”105 The park was unquestionably being 
set aside for a public purpose. However, this public purpose was deemed 
compatible with the notion of private, short-term leases of the land.106 
Landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead served as one of the +rst 
appointed Commissioners of the land grant within Yosemite Valley and the 
Mariposa Big Tree Grove.107 In that capacity, Olmstead wrote Yosemite Valley 
and the Mariposa Big Trees.108 He described the natural beauty of the scenery, 
concluding, “[i]t is the will of the nation as embodied in the act of Congress 
that this scenery shall never be private property, but that like certain 
defensive points upon our coast it shall be held solely for public purposes.”109 
He articulated a rationale for preserving nature in public trust: 
[T]he occasional contemplation of natural scenes of an impressive character, 
particularly if this contemplation occurs in connection with relief from 
ordinary cares, change of air and change of habits, is favorable to the health 
and vigor of men and especially to the health and vigor of their intellect 
beyond any other conditions which can be o%ered them, that it not only gives 
 
103 Act of Mar. &, $%"$, ch. $($, § $, &$ Stat. $!(*, $&#* (codi+ed at $( U.S.C. § !($). 
104 See Nagle, supra note !#, at )(* & n.$) ("#$') (discussing controversy over claims to being 
the “+rst” national park); Act of June !#, $)(&, ch. $)&, $! Stat. !"'. 
105 § $, $! Stat. at !"'. 
106 See infra Part II.C. 
107 Draft of Preliminary Report upon the Yosemite and Big Tree Grove; Typed Transcription of Draft 
of Preliminary Report upon the Yosemite and Big Tree Grove; and Typed Transcription of Letter on the Great 
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109 FREDRICK LAW OLMSTED, The Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove, in 
AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS ', % (Lary M. Dilsaver ed., 
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pleasure for the time being but increases the subsequent capacity for 
happiness and the means of securing happiness.110 
 
He lamented that only wealthy people had the means to enjoy the 
“choicest natural scenes in the country and the means of recreation connected 
with them.”111 In his view, public land should be available for those of ordinary 
means.112 He argued that present enjoyment of these parks must be tempered 
by “the rights of posterity” and a “duty of preservation” to future generations.113 
Like Olmstead, but inspired by the Romantic notion of conservation, 
Muir also valued these “spectacular” settings where “something entirely 
di,erent broke through in the mind” than in ordinary life.114 For Muir, the 
virtue of publicness of the park was twofold: +rst, to provide spaces for all 
people to interact with majesty and awe, which would bring them out of their 
ordinary lives; and second, to provide this majesty to those who were of 
average means and not wealthy, not merely to those who could a,ord access 
to such lands independent of public commitments. 
Olmstead and Muir were not alone expressing concerns about preserving 
the land for public bene+t against private encroachment. In #&)#, J.D. 
Whitney, the State Geologist of California, prepared The Yosemite Guidebook 
at the direction of the Geological Survey of California for the primary 
purpose of calling “the attention of the public to the scenery of California.”115 
He lamented the e,orts of two individuals to claim private ownership of land 
within the Yosemite Valley, as well as e,orts to pass bills (ultimately 
unsuccessfully) in the state legislature on their behalf: 
What the result will be, if ever such a bill passes, it is not di&cult to predict. 
The Yosemite Valley, instead of being held by the State for the bene"t of the 
people, and “for public use, resort, and pleasure,” as was solemnly promised, 
will become the property of private individuals, and will be held and managed 
for private bene"t and not for the public good.116 
 
110 Id. at $$. 
111 Id. at $!. 
112 Id. at $!-$&. 
113 Id. at $*. Olmstead, supra note $#*. 
114 Purdy, supra note &!, at $$&)-&%. 
115 J.D. WHITNEY, THE YOSEMITE GUIDE-BOOK % (Univ. Press: Welch, Bigelow, & Co., 
Cambridge, $)*$) ($)()), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/ajl!'$%.###$.##$?view2toc 
[https://perma.cc/HBG'-BQYZ]. 
116 Id. at $%-"#. These men included J.M. Hutchings, who was running a small hotel on the 
claimed land, and James C. Lamon, who was residing on land he claimed was his. ISE, supra note !#, 
at '&. Although the legislation did not pass, Hutchings received a lease to continue operating his 
hotel and compensation, and the other claimant likewise received some compensation. Id. at ''. 
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He expressed concern that the Yosemite Valley might become privately 
developed like the areas around Niagara Falls in New York State, which even 
by the #&$*s had been privatized to the extent that “not a single point 
remained in the United States from which the falls could be viewed without 
paying a landowner an entry fee.”117 Granting these two private claims could, 
in his view, lead to a slippery slope in which private parties could charge tolls 
or fees to the public to view the natural scenery, diminishing the publicness 
of the lands intended to be held in trust for the bene+t of the people.118 He 
further lamented that if these private claims were granted, it would be 
impossible to deny subsequent private claims to this land that, in his view, 
must remain “inalienable for all time.”119 Thus, again, these concerns 
demonstrate a signi+cant value of publicness as the prevention of exclusion 
and the “holdout problem” that can arise when private property rights 
encroach upon the public interest. 
Despite these warnings, the Valley quickly became developed by 
commercial interests: 
Under lax state management, the Yosemite Valley emerged as a crazy quilt of 
roads, hotels, and cabins, and pastures and pens for cattle, hogs, mules, and 
horses. Tilled lands supplied food for residents and visitors, and feed for 
livestock; irrigation dams and ditches supported agriculture; and timber 
operations supplied wood for construction, fencing, and heating. Amid the 
clutter of development stood one “luxury” hotel, the three-and-a-half-story 
Stoneman House, built in '(().120 
By #&&%, Muir became concerned about a di,erent form of private action 
that might degrade the Valley: namely, that the lands “surrounding Yosemite 
Valley, which lacked government protection, were being overrun and 
destroyed by domestic sheep grazing.”121 This need to make these surrounding 
 
117 Joseph L. Sax, America’s National Parks: Their Principles, Purposes, and Prospects, NAT. HIST., 
Oct. $%*(, at '*, (&; see also WHITNEY, supra note $$', at "# (“As the tide of travel in the direction of 
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lands public was acute because of the twin concerns of destruction and 
commodi+cation—overgrazing of public lands could destroy them, as in the 
classic tragedy of the commons.122 
Muir enlisted the assistance of Robert Underwood Johnson, an 
“environmentalist and influential magazine editor,” and together they lobbied 
Congress to protect the areas surrounding the Valley by designating them as 
protected park lands by the United States.123 On October #, #&%*, Congress did 
so, declaring that more than #,'** square miles of land should be set aside; 
ultimately these lands became part of the consolidated Yosemite National Park.124 
After campaigns by the Sierra Club and Muir, among others, to press for 
recession of Yosemite Valley to the federal government, in #%*', the State of 
California enacted legislation granting back to the United States the 
protected land within the Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree Grove 
parks and the trusts created by Congress to be maintained “as a national 
park.”125 In #%*$, the United States accepted the recession of the land from 
the state and appropriated funds from the Treasury for the “management, 
protection and improvement of the Yosemite National Park.”126 In #%#(, 
Congress adopted an Act to acquire title to “any or all of the lands held in 
private ownership within the boundaries” of Yosemite National Park, o,ering 
in exchange certain “decayed or matured timber” that could easily be removed 
without otherwise impairing the “scenic beauty” of the park.127 
Although Congress set aside the land within the Yosemite Valley as a 
public trust managed by the State of California in #&$", the title of +rst 
national park created as such belongs to Yellowstone National Park.128 Early 
 
which was set aside as ‘reserved forest lands’ in $)%#, a doughnut-shaped park, to which the Central 
Valley was added in $%#(.” ISE, supra note !#, at '$; cf. id. at '' (noting that the name “Yosemite” 
does not appear in the $)%# Act, and that Congress originally considered the reservation to be one 
of forest land). The $)%# Act “created a rather peculiar situation—a national park surrounding a 
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122 On the tragedy of the commons, see Hardin, supra note )". 
123 Yosemite National Park Established, supra note $"$. 
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125 Yosemite-Regranting to United States, ch. (#, $%#' Cal. Stat. '&. The state had had 
di.culty managing the land and protecting the wildlife. ISE, supra note !#, at ')-'% (discussing 
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recession of the park to the United States). 
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timber, among other claims, while that number was revised downward in $)%) to '!,%!$ acres. ISE, 
supra note !#, at ('-((. 
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128 '& U.S.C. § $##$#$(b)($)(a) (“[T]he National Park System began with the establishment of 
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discussions highlight concerns about privatization and commodi+cation of 
the park’s precious resources. In #&)(, Congress established a tract of land in 
the Territories of Montana and Wyoming near the headwaters of the 
Yellowstone River as “a public park or pleasuring-ground for the bene+t and 
enjoyment of the people.”129 In the House Report that accompanied the bill, 
the Committee on Public Lands took pains to disclaim any potential for the 
land to be inhabitable, or a source of commercial revenue through mining or 
agriculture.130 The Committee highlighted the importance of protecting these 
lands from those who would seek to pro+t from their natural beauty as 
privateers had near Niagara Falls: 
Persons are now waiting for the spring to open to enter in and take possession 
of these remarkable curiosities, to make merchandise of these beautiful 
specimens, to fence in these rare wonders so as to charge visitors a fee, as is 
now done at Niagara Falls, for the sight of that which ought to be as free as 
the air or water.131 
One Senator spoke in favor of the bill, contending that if the land were 
not set aside, 
it is possible that some person may go there and plant himself right across 
the only path that leads to these wonders, and charge every man that passes 
along between the gorges of these mountains a fee of a dollar or "ve dollars. 
He may place an obstruction there, and toll may be gathered from every 
person who goes to see these wonders of creation.132 
These concerns echo the holdout problem identi+ed by Carol Rose, in 
which private actors could prevent or increase the costs for members of the 
public to appreciate nature’s splendor. The enacting legislation provided that 
the Secretary of the Interior had authority to make necessary rules and 
regulations to manage the land, to “provide for the preservation, from injury 
or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders 
within said park, and their retention in their natural condition.”133 
These early discussions at the time of the establishment of the parks 
surfaced a number of speci+c concerns that private or commercial interests 
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would (#) strip the land of its natural assets to sell them in private markets 
(destruction and commodi+cation); (() lay claims to private ownership of 
these wonders, and prevent members of the public from viewing them 
(exclusion); (!) otherwise limit the ability of the public to enjoy these 
aesthetic experiences by charging fees to view or enter these lands (exclusion 
and commodi+cation); or (") destroy the natural wonders through overuse, 
including through activities like grazing (destruction). In some sense, these 
concerns re/ect the view that no private interest should be allowed to 
monopolize or exclude members of the public from enjoying their natural 
rights to these wonders, nor should their physical actions (removal or 
destruction of nature) prevent anyone from enjoying them in the present or 
the future. 134 The virtues of publicness of the parks are those that stand as 
foils to these concerns. 
The creation of national parks was not merely the creation of parks; it was 
the creation of national parks. Between #&)( when Congress designated 
Yellowstone National Park, and #%#$ when Congress ultimately passed the 
Organic Act, Congress created fourteen national parks by statute, providing 
similar language that these public lands were for the “bene+t and enjoyment 
of the people.”135 Within this time period came the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt, the President most widely associated with the conservation 
movement, who set aside more than (!* million acres of public lands as 
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135 Act of Aug. %, $%$(, ch. !#", § $, !% Stat. &&", &&"-&! (establishing Lassen Volcanic National 
Park); Act of Aug. $, $%$(, ch. "(&, § $, !% Stat. &!", &!" (establishing Hawaii National Park); Act of 
Jan. "(, $%$', ch. $%, § $, !) Stat. *%), *%)-)## (establishing Rocky Mountain National Park); Act of 
May $$, $%$#, ch. ""(, § $, !( Stat. !'&, !'& (establishing Glacier National Park); Act of May "", $%#", 
ch. )"#, § $, !" Stat. "#", "#" (establishing Crater Lake National Park); Act of Mar. ", $)%%, ch. !**, 
§ $, !# Stat. %%!, %%!-%& (establishing Mount Rainier National Park); Act of Sept. "', $)%#, ch. %"(, 
§ $, "( Stat. &*), &*) (establishing Sequoia National Park, later King’s Canyon); Act of Oct. $, $)%#, 
ch. $"(", "( Stat. ('#, ('#-'$ (establishing Yosemite National Park); Act of Jan. %, $%#!, ch. (!, !" 
Stat. *(', *('-(( (establishing Wind Cave National Park); Act of June "%, $%#(, ch. !(#*, !& Stat. 
($', ($(-($* (establishing Mesa Verde National Park). See generally Nagle, supra note !#, at )(* & 
n.$% (listing these enactments and also noting that “[t]hree other early national parks are no longer 
national parks” including Sully’s Hill National Park, Platt National Park in Oklahoma, and Mackinac 
Island National Park) (citing JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW’S ENVIRONMENT: HOW THE LAW 
SHAPES THE PLACES WE LIVE $#"-#! ("#$#)). In $%*# and $%*), Congress adopted the National 
Park System General Authorities Act and the Redwoods Act, respectively, to update the $%$( 
Organic Act. National Park system General Authorities Act, Pub. L. No. %$-!)!, § $, )& Stat. )"', 
)"' ($%*#) (codi+ed as amended at $( U.S.C. § la-I ($%%&) (current version at '& U.S.C $##$#$(b)); 
Redwoods Act, Pub. L. No. %'-"'#, § $#$(b), %" Stat. $(!, $(( ($%*)) (codi+ed as amended at $( 
U.S.C. § la-$ ($%%&) (current version at '& U.S.C $##$#$(b)). These two statutes rea.rmed that all 
of the national parks, regardless of the fact that they were established with di-erent statutes, are 
“united through their inter-related purposes and resources” into a single system and are to be held 
to the same legal standards under the Organic Act. Nagle, supra note !#, at )*$ & nn.!(-!*. 
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national parks, national monuments, and forests during his time in o.ce.136 
Roosevelt repeatedly spoke of his goal of civic nation-building. In his 
speeches to the nation, Roosevelt emphasized the importance of elevating 
“‘the public interest’ as distinct from individual, class, or sectional 
interests.”137 According to Jed Purdy, Roosevelt’s “‘new nationalism’ . . . 
treated conservation as both a master-metaphor for wise governance and as a 
source of concrete policies for civic improvement.”138 
Public lands served this new nationalism, according to Roosevelt, in at 
least three ways.139 The +rst was the most abstract but arguably the deepest: 
the setting aside by government of public lands (including, but not limited to 
the national parks) was a public statement of common purpose “transcending 
faction” which could “unite a divided polity.”140 This was consistent with 
Roosevelt’s strong anti-monopolist views, such as his statement that “natural 
resources must be used for the bene+t of all of our people, and not 
monopolized for the bene+t of the few.”141 Second, Roosevelt viewed public 
lands as a form of “civic commons” where Americans from di,erent walks of 
life could interact, and thus escape factionalism according to class.142 
Roosevelt’s words about the national forests could apply with equal force to 
the parks: they could o,er “free camping grounds for the ever-increasing 
numbers of men and women who have learned to +nd rest, health, and 
recreation in the splendid forests and /ower-clad meadows of our 
 
136 Theodore Roosevelt and Conservation, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov 
/thro/learn/historyculture/theodore-roosevelt-and-conservation.htm [https://perma.cc/W(L'-
*%WA] (last updated Nov. $(, "#$*). Like John Muir, President Roosevelt’s legacy with respect to 
inclusion and race is not unblemished. Robin Pogrebin, Roosevelt Statute To Be Removed From Museum 
of Natural History, N.Y. TIMES (June "', "#"#), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
"#"#/#(/"$/arts/design/roosevelt-statue-to-be-removed-from-museum-of-natural-history.html 
[https://perma.cc/R8WT-EE9Q] (discussing the museum’s removal of Roosevelt’s statute as it was 
marred by racist imagery and his support of the eugenics movement, but noting the renaming of a 
Hall within the Museum to recognize his “conservation legacy”). 
137 Purdy, supra note &!!, at $$'". 
138 Id. at $$'( & nn. $#%-$'; see also Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, Speech before the 
Hamilton Club (Apr. $#, $)%%), reprinted in THE STRENUOUS LIFE: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES $ ($%#"). 
139 Purdy, supra note &!, at $$'(-'%. 
140 Id. at $$'*. 
141 Id. (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The New Nationalism, Speech at Osawatomie (Aug. 
!$, $%$#), reprinted in THE NEW NATIONALISM "$ ($%$#)). Roosevelt identi+ed with the 
conservationist approach to public lands: “Conservation means development as much as it does 
protection.” ROOSEVELT, supra. But conservation did not “recognize the right to waste [natural 
resources], or to rob, by wasteful use, the generations that come after us.” Id. 
142 Purdy, supra note &!, at $$'*-'), $$') nn. $"#-"$; ROOSEVELT, supra note )', at *$ (“[T]he 
fact remains that the only true solution of our political and social problems lies in cultivating 
everywhere the spirit of brotherhood, of fellow-feeling and understanding between man and man, 
and the willingness to treat a man as a man, which are the essential factors in American democracy 
as we still see it in the country districts.”). 
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mountains.”143 Again, the goal was to create a nation that would transcend 
factional interests. Third, the national parks and other public lands would 
promote the development of “vigorous character” including what Purdy 
refers to as the “masculine virtues” that come from “natural outdoor play.”144 
This purpose did not necessarily relate to avoiding factionalism (and was 
clearly restricted at the time to boys). However, it undoubtedly promoted 
“civic virtue” which the state has an obligation to promote on behalf of its 
citizens. Thus, the publicness of the parks is necessary, at least in signi+cant 
part, to create the idea of the nation of the United States. The parks stand as 
an expression of the nation’s values. 
President Roosevelt identi+ed how the interests of “the few” might 
“sacri+ce[e] the future of the Nation as a whole to their own self-interest of 
the moment.”145 Although speaking of national forests rather than the parks, 
he clearly identi+ed public forest lands with the Nation itself: “These lands, 
because they form a National asset, are as emphatically national as the rivers 
which they feed, and which /ow through so many States before they reach 
the ocean.”146 Thus, public lands—which include but are not limited to the 
national parks—do not merely provide a space for individuals to experience 
wonder and awe, or quiet contemplation away from the routines of ordinary 
life. They both build and constitute the nation itself. This nation-building 
role could overcome the narrow concerns of factions and private interests. 
Despite these concerns in early years about dominant or monopolistic 
commercial enterprise and private factions destroying these public virtues, at 
least some forms of commercial enterprise, like private hotel 
accommodations, were expressly incorporated in the acts establishing the 
parks. In other words, not all private commercial enterprise was originally 
seen as incompatible with the idea of creating national parks for the bene+t 
of the public. The next section demonstrates this ambivalence. 
C.  A Role for Private Enterprise—But Not Too Much 
While setting aside these lands for public bene+t, Congress recognized 
that accommodations were required in order to bring visitors to the parks. 
Only if members of the public visited the parks would constituencies develop 
to support their continued operation and the creation of more parks. 
 
143 Theodore Roosevelt, President of U.S., State of the Union Address (Dec. !, $%#$), in STATE 
OF THE UNION ADDRESSES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT ("##&) (ebook) 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/'#!"/'#!"-h/'#!"-h.htm,dec$%#$ [https://perma.cc/SEH%-(WX!]. 
144 Purdy, supra note &!, at $$')-'%. 
145 Theodore Roosevelt, President of U.S., State of the Union Address (Dec. !, $%#*), in STATE 
OF THE UNION ADDRESSES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note $&!. 
146 Id. 
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Accordingly, many of the individual statutes creating national parks, as well 
as the #%#$ Organic Act itself, permitted the leasing of land to private third 
parties to erect accommodations for visitors.147 Congress could have directed 
the Department of the Interior to create such accommodations under 
government ownership and control. However, it did not. Thus, from their 
inception, the national parks—these emblems of publicness—acknowledged 
some role for private enterprise. 
#. The Early Years 
In the Yosemite Valley and what ultimately became Yosemite National 
Park, small hotel accommodations were constructed beginning in #&''.148 
Beginning in #&)&, privately run campgrounds were also being developed in 
the park.149 In #&&%, the Curry family, whose interests later were consolidated 
into the Yosemite Park & Curry Company,150 developed privately run 
campsites and other services for visitors.151 They established entertainment 
traditions for park visitors like the popular “+refall” attraction, which 
involved pushing burning embers over Glacier Point and creating a visible 
cascade of +re after dark.152 The Curry family was so successful that they 
achieved “practical monopoly” status over tourist facilities in Yosemite by the 
time they merged with another entity to form the Yosemite Park & Curry 
Company.153 
In #&)(, the legislation that established Yellowstone National Park also 
provided expressly for the Secretary of the Interior to enter into leases of up 
to ten years for “small parcels of ground, at such places in said park as shall 
 
147 See, e.g., Act of Mar. $, $)*", ch. "&, § " $* Stat. !", !! (authorizing the Secretary of the 
Interior to lease “small parcels of ground” for up to ten years, and to use any revenue collected to 
provide for management of the park and the “construction of roads and bridle-paths therein” in 
Yellowstone); Act of Apr. "#, $)!", ch. *#, § " & Stat. at Large '#', '#' (authorizing the governor in 
the Territory of Arkansas to “let out or lease said springs” for up to a +ve-year term, with the rents 
and pro+ts being applied “to the opening and improving” of roads in the Territory). Similar 
language appears in the other enacting statutes. See Nagle, supra note !#, at )() & n."# (citing 
similar language in establishment acts of Lassen Volcanic National Park, Hawaii National Park, 
Glacier National Park, Mount Rainier National Park, Wind Cave National Park, Crater Lake 
National Park, and Sequoia National Park). 
148 See ISE, supra note !#, at )#-)$ (describing the Lower Hotel, Black’s, the Upper Hotel, and 
the Hutchings Hotel, among others). 
149 Id. at )$. 
150 Frank Cli-ord, Curry Co. Turns over Yosemite Concessions, L.A. TIMES (Oct. ", $%%!, $":## 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-$%%!-$#-#"-mn-&$&*#-story.html [https://perma.cc 
/)LP%-PH)(]; Yosemite Park & Curry Company Collection, ONLINE ARCHIVE OF CAL., 
https://oac.cdlib.org/+ndaid/ark:/$!#!#/c)n!#"f!/ [https://perma.cc/&HZL-"B)H]. 
151 ISE, supra note !#, at )". 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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require the erection of buildings for the accommodation of visitors” with “all 
of the proceeds” from these leases going to fund the construction of roads 
and bridle paths” within the park.154 As a result of the short lease terms, in 
the early years, many private entrepreneurs opted to seek leases for “camps 
and transportation facilities” rather than for hotels, as these movable assets 
could be “taken out of the park” if a lease was not renewed.155 Even before 
#&)(, several accommodations had been built in the area, even though the 
owners lacked “right or title,” to the land.156 
This role for private enterprise was limited by statute, however. In #&&! 
and #&%", in response to concerns that had arisen in the parks about the 
creation of a quasi-monopoly in a private concession agreement,157 Congress 
more narrowly de+ned the potential lease terms by setting maximum acreage 
limits, prohibiting the leasing of natural “objects of curiosity or interest” like 
the geysers themselves, and prohibiting the exclusion of members of the 
public from free access to these natural wonders.158 
Some of the most prominent business +rms of their day—the railroads—
were also early supporters of and bene+ciaries of the parks. In #&&!, the 
Northern Paci+c Railroad entered into a lease agreement with the Interior 
Department, having recognized the bene+t to its railroad business of having 
a wondrous place to visit at a “reasonable” price.159 Other concessioners 
developed permanent tent campgrounds with other services, and by #%#*, -# 
 
154 Act of Mar. $, $)*", ch. "&, § ", $* Stat. $*, !", !!. There was a widespread belief at the time 
that the park would be “self-supporting, that concessioners would pay as rents enough to provide for 
administration and protection” of the park and that thus, Congressional appropriations would not 
be necessary. However, this turned out not to be the case. ISE, supra note !#, at "#. Beginning in 
$)*), Congress appropriated some funds for the “protection, preservation and improvement of 
Yellowstone Park.” Id. at "%. 
155 ISE, supra note !#, at !". The length of the contract term matters a great deal for the 
question of investment in immovable facilities. Id. at ($"-$!. Too short a term will discourage the 
construction of facilities with a long lifespan, as the amortization period is too short. In addition, 
short-term leases raise questions over how to compensate the concessioner if the concession contract 
is not renewed and some other entity is allowed to use the facilities under a new contract. Id. 
156 Id. at !!. 
157 See id. at !'-!% (discussing the cancelled Hobart-Douglas-Hatch quasi-monopoly lease, and 
the acts of $))! and $)%& that de+ned the terms of leases for hotel accommodations). 
158 Id. at !%. 
159 Id.; see also Modernizing the National Park Service Concession Program: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Interior of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, $$&th Cong. ( ("#$') (statement 
of Lena McDowall, Chief Fin. O.cer, Nat’l Park Serv., Dep’t of the Interior) (“Concessions in our 
national parks predate the formation of the National Park Service. Most of the large concessions 
operations in our Western parks were begun in the late $)##s by the large railroads or companies 
looking to serve the growing demands of travelers from the eastern United States.”). In $%#(, 
Congress further amended the law to permit concessioners to lease up to "## acres of land, and to 
place mortgages on their properties. ISE, supra note !#, at !%. 
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million had been invested in Yellowstone. By #%#(, concessioners had earned 
-# million in pro+ts.160 
(. The Organic Act 
When Congress established the National Park System in #%#$, Director 
Stephen Mather largely sought to consolidate private concessions into a 
“regulated monopoly.”161 The Organic Act recognized that accommodations 
and other infrastructure would be needed to bring members of the public to 
enjoy and use the parks. However, these leases and permits to operate 
accommodations were limited in time and in other ways to ensure that the 
public would always have free access to the parks. The Act therefore 
authorized the Director of the NPS to 
grant privileges, leases, and permits for the use of land for the 
accommodation of visitors in the various parks, monuments, or other 
reservations herein provided for, but for periods not exceeding twenty years; 
and no natural curiosities, wonders, or objects of interest shall be leased, 
rented, or granted to anyone on such terms as to interfere with free access to 
them by the public . . . .162 
In the absence of adequate accommodations, it would be less likely that 
people would visit the parks, and visitors were desirable as they would create 
a natural constituency for the parks over time.163 This authority was limited 
only by the term limit and by the proviso that “no natural curiosities, wonders, 
or objects of interest shall be leased, rented, or granted to anyone on such 
terms as to interfere with free access to them by the public.”164 
As John Ise points out in his history of the national parks, Congress could 
have opted for a di,erent mix of public and private for the construction and 
operation of accommodations.165 Ise concludes that because Congress failed 
to appropriate any money for construction and operation of facilities, in the 
early years, private construction was often the only option.166 Early 
experiences in the parks demonstrated that in the absence of regulated 
 
160 ISE, supra note !#, at &#. 
161 Id. at )". In fact, while private enterprise was the norm, there were some government 
owned-and-operated accommodations in Yosemite, the Petri+ed Forest, and at Mount McKinley 
(now Denali), among others. Id. at ($&. 
162 Act of Aug. "', $%$(, ch. &#) § !, !% Stat. '!', '!'. In $%'), Congress raised this to a 
maximum of !# years. Act of May "%, $%'), Pub. L. No. )'-&!&, *" Stat. $'" (codi+ed at $( U.S.C. 
§ !) (repealed and recodi+ed as amended at '& U.S.C. § $#"$#$). 
163 See supra note ) and accompanying text. 
164 § !, !% Stat. at '!'. 
165 ISE, supra note !#, at (#(. 
166 Id. 
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monopolies, competing concessioners sought to provide everything from 
transportation to lodging, but were unable to provide “reliable” service. 167 In 
contrast to those early years, Ise noted that there is now a great deal of 
competition between services provided inside the parks and those provided 
outside park boundaries by a more competitive market, especially now that 
cars allow people to travel easily across the boundary line.168 
Other forms of private enterprise have long existed within federal public 
lands, including the national parks, and have raised similar concerns regarding 
the appropriate balance between use and preservation. As Bruce Huber has 
pointed out, private claims to public lands include grazing rights, privately 
owned cabins, and mineral rights, among others.169 Some of these private 
claims are held by individuals, and others are held by business +rms. Huber 
demonstrated that such private claims to public lands have been surprisingly 
durable, even claims that potentially interfere with public access or that are 
consumptive, like grazing.170 The forms of private activity that Huber focused 
on in his study fall into these areas of traditional concern. For example, some 
of these private claims are extractive and commodify the land: grazing and 
mining both remove something from the land, in some cases in exchange for 
a fee. Some of these forms of privatization can lead to the exclusion of the 
public. For example, building a private cabin on public land precludes 
members of the public from accessing or using the space. 
This narrative demonstrates that while early advocates and creators of 
these parks feared encroachment of private enterprise, they nonetheless had 
to accommodate some private enterprise within the parks. Even in the earliest 
years, it was clear that limits needed to be set to ensure that what was meant 
for the use and enjoyment of the public would not be transformed into private 
property with members of the public excluded from the parks’ use and 
enjoyment. 
There are, in addition to concessions, other private corporate actions that 
do not harm or extract anything from the parks, nor do they exclude members 
of the public from their use. Rather, they embody a di,erent form of 
commercial bene+t—commercial bene+t through association with the 
national parks’ goodwill. It is to building out the contours of this 
phenomenon that the Article now turns. 
 
167 Id. at (#*-#). Other concerns, for example, that tourists could not in their short visits 
properly inform themselves regarding the di-erences between two +rms providing services, id. at 
(#), are likely unfounded in the internet era. 
168 Id. at (#)-#%. 
169 Huber, supra note *. 
170 Id. at $##", $##', $#$*. 
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III. NON-EXTRACTIVE CORPORATE ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PARKS 
This Part is both descriptive and analytical. To add to the historical case 
study of concessions in the last Part, it o,ers two more recent examples that 
are shades of the same phenomenon—non-extractive corporate activities 
within the national parks that impose no physical harm and do not exclude 
members of the public, yet nonetheless raise objections regarding the 
appropriate line between public and private. These are corporate 
concessioners’ attempts to own trademarks to signi+cant attractions within 
the parks and corporate philanthropy/cause-related marketing. The next Part 
will then take a deep dive into the normative questions regarding the bene+ts 
to business +rms of these relationships and the potential impact—including 
both bene+ts and harms—on the parks. 
A. A Hotel by Any Other Name: Ownership of Intangible Property 
It is worth focusing on a controversy in which non-extractive corporate 
action within the parks nonetheless raised serious concerns about the 
appropriate boundary between public and private. That controversy is a 
recently settled dispute over who owned the trademarks to the names of 
historic landmarked properties within Yosemite National Park. Unlike the 
concerns about privatization a century ago, in this case, the private 
concessioner did not claim ownership to any natural wonders, or even to the 
hotels it operated. Such claims, if validated, would have raised the concerns 
that were at the forefront of the early park supporters’ minds: the ability of 
private actors to exclude members of the public or to raise fees and tolls to 
make entry to the parks more expensive, the potential to physically harm the 
parks, or the practice of removing and commodifying something within the 
parks for sale in a market. Instead, a concessioner claimed ownership over 
something intangible—the famous names of several historic hotels and 
properties, as well as the name Yosemite National Park itself. These claims of 
ownership over intangible property raised signi+cant concerns about private 
encroachment on the publicness of the parks. 
On September #), (*#', Plainti, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. 
(“Delaware North”) +led suit against the National Park Service (NPS), 
seeking damages under the Tucker Act171 resulting from an alleged breach of 
contract.172 The gravamen of Delaware North’s complaint related to the NPS’s 
 
171 Tucker Act, ") U.S.C. § $&%$ (waiving the United States Government’s sovereign immunity 
with respect to certain claims). 
172 Complaint ¶ $, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. v. United States, No. $:$'-cv-#$#!&-
PEC (Fed. Cl. dismissed Aug. !#, "#$%) [hereinafter DNC Complaint]; First Amended Complaint 
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conducting of a competitive bidding process for a new concession contract at 
Yosemite. When the NPS ultimately awarded that contract to a new 
concessioner, Aramark Hospitality (a subsidiary of the Aramark 
Corporation), Delaware North alleged that the NPS failed to insist that 
Aramark pay the full, fair market value of Delaware North’s intangible 
property, including its intellectual property.173 According to Delaware North, 
this intellectual property included trademarks it held in the names of several 
historic landmarked properties within Yosemite, including the famed 
Ahwahnee and Wawona hotels, as well as certain speci+c logos and designs 
relating to sites within Yosemite.174 
Delaware North had been awarded the concession contract with the NPS 
in #%%!. Previously, the contract had been held by the Yosemite Park & Curry 
Co. (YP&CC), which held a near-monopoly on the concessions within 
Yosemite National Park since the early #%**s. In #%%#, MCA, the parent 
company of the Yosemite Park & Curry Company, was acquired by the 
Japanese +rm Matsushita.175 No law expressly prohibited foreign ownership 
of a concessioner in the national parks. However, the Department of the 
Interior and the NPS, along with the National Park Foundation (NPF), 
agreed that the NPF would enter into an agreement with MCA to purchase 
#**% of MCA’s stock in YP&CC for -"%.' million plus interest, to be paid 
from revenues generated by concessions operations beginning in #%%!.176 
According to the Secretary of the Interior, the goal of the agreement was to 
acquire and extinguish the possessory interest held by MCA/YP&CC, so that 
there would be no preferential right of renewal of the concession contract and 
new bidders could bid on an even playing +eld.177 In #%%(, the NPS bid out 
the contract to run the concession, including provisions in the request for 
proposals that the successor concessioner would acquire all of YP&CC’s 
stock.178 Delaware North won the contract. Relevant to this litigation, in #%&&, 
 
¶¶ $-", $!, "#, "'-!!, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. v. United States, No. $:$'-cv-#-$#!&-
PEC (Fed. Cl. dismissed Aug. !#, "#$%) [hereinafter DNC Amended Complaint]. 
173 DNC Complaint, supra note $*", ¶¶ $, $%, "(. 
174 DNC Amended Complaint, supra note $*", ¶¶ $!, "#, "'-!!. 
175 See Proposed Sale of the Yosemite Park & Curry Co.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands, 
Nat’l Parks, and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., $#"d Cong. * ($%%$) (statement of Robert 
D. Hadl, Vice President and Gen. Couns., MCA, Inc.). 
176 Proposed Sale of the Yosemite Park & Curry Co.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands, 
Nat’l Parks, and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., $#"d Cong. &-' ($%%$) (statement of 
Hon. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior, Accompanied By James Ridenour, Dir., Nat’l 
Park Serv.). 
177 Proposed Sale of the Yosemite Park & Curry Co.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands, 
Nat’l Parks, and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., $#"d Cong. "" ($%%$) (statement of 
Leonard L. Silverstein, Couns., Nat’l Park Found.). 
178 Delaware North alleged in its complaint that it purchased not stock but the assets of the 
YP&CC pursuant to contract CC-YOSE##&-%!. DNC Complaint, supra note $*", ¶¶ ', $!. 
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YP&CC had +led a trademark application for “The Ahwahnee,” and in (**!, 
the USPTO registered that the trademark had been conveyed from YP&CC 
to Delaware North.179 
A brief explanation of the concession law that governed the contract is in 
order to help understand Delaware North’s complaint. In #%$', Congress 
adopted the National Park System Concessions Policy Act (Concessions 
Policy Act), to modernize the relationship between concessioners and the 
NPS.180 The Concessions Policy Act declared: 
the preservation of park values requires that such public accommodations, 
facilities, and services as have to be provided within those areas should be 
provided only under carefully controlled safeguards against unregulated and 
indiscriminate use, so that the heavy visitation will not unduly impair these 
values and so that development of such facilities can best be limited to 
locations where the least damage to park values will be caused.181 
Thus any concessions were to be “limited to those that are necessary and 
appropriate for public use and enjoyment” of the parks, and that are 
“consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and 
conservation of the areas.”182 
While declaring its intent to protect the parks against damage, Congress 
nonetheless acknowledged the need for concessioners to “realize a pro+t on 
[their] operation as a whole commensurate with the capital invested and the 
obligations assumed.”183 Accordingly, the Concessions Policy Act of #%$' gave 
signi+cant privileges to concessioners. Principal among these privileges were 
a preferential right of renewal and a possessory interest in improvements.184 
 
179 Amended Answer to Plainti- ’s First Amended Complaint ¶ $(*, DNC Parks & Resorts at 
Yosemite, Inc. v. United States of America, No. $'-cv-$#!& (Fed. Cl. "#$)) [hereinafter Amended 
Answer to DNC Amended Complaint]. 
180 Act of Oct. %, $%(', Pub. L. No. )%-"&%, *% Stat. %(%, repealed by Act of Nov. $!, $%%), Pub. 
L. No. $#'-!%$, § &$'(a), $$" Stat. !&%*, !'$' ($%%)). 
181 Id. § $, at %(%. These sections were editorially transferred as a note under '& U.S.C. 
§ $#$%$", by Pub. L. No. $$!-")*, $") Stat. !#%& ("#$&). Doremus, supra note !*, at &*# n.!&%. 
182 § $, *% Stat. at %(%. 
183 Id. § !, at %(%. The Act stated that concessioners needed protection “against loss of 
investment in structures, +xtures, improvements, equipment, supplies, and other tangible property 
provided by him for the purposes of the contract.” Id. 
184 Id. § &, at %*#. The Act permitted the Secretary to 
authorize the operation of all accommodations, facilities, and services for visitors, or 
of all such accommodations, facilities, and services of generally similar character, in 
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Id. 
)* University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. #$%: !! 
The purpose of the preferential right of renewal was to provide continuity of 
service and to encourage long-term investment in the facilities by those 
concessioners who satisfactorily performed their obligations under prior 
contracts.185 If the Secretary chose to extend a contract, he was required to 
“give reasonable public notice of his intention so to do” and to consider other 
proposals, but the preference remained.186 In addition, the possessory interest 
provisions made clear that if a concessioner “acquired or constructed . . . any 
structure, +xture, or improvement” within a park, the concessioner gained a 
“possessory interest therein, which shall consist of all incidents of ownership 
except legal title,” which vested in the United States.187 This possessory 
interest was so strong that it would “not be extinguished by the expiration or 
other termination of the contract” and, if the improvement was “taken for 
public use,” required the United States to pay “just compensation.”188 
In reaction to criticisms that the #%$' Act gave too much power and pro+t 
to concessioners, in #%%&, Congress enacted the National Park Service 
Concessions Management Improvement Act.189 In that Act, Congress 
declared that 
the preservation and conservation of System unit resources and values 
requires that public accommodations, facilities, and services that have to be 
provided within those System units should be provided only under carefully 
controlled safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use, so that— 
(') visitation will not unduly impair those resources and values; and 
(*) development of public accommodations, facilities, and services within 
System units can best be limited to locations that are consistent to the highest 
practicable degree with the preservation and conservation of the resources 
and values of the System units.190 
Congress further declared that accommodations “shall be limited” to those 
that are “necessary and appropriate” for public use and enjoyment and that 
are “consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and 
conservation of the resources and values” of the park.191 
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The #%%& Act, which remains in e,ect, expressly requires competitive 
selection of contractors and requires public solicitation of proposals.192 The 
Act prohibits the Secretary from granting a preferential right of renewal,193 
except for very small out+tter and guide concession contracts resulting in 
gross annual receipts of less than -'**,***.194 The Act clari+es that a 
preferential right of renewal in such cases means only that the existing 
concessioner has the opportunity to “match the terms and conditions of any 
competing proposal” that the Secretary has determined to be the “best 
proposal” under criteria set forth in the statute.195 In addition, the NPS must 
now publicly solicit proposals for concession contracts. It is required to select 
the best proposal that meets the objectives of “protecting, conserving, and 
preserving resources of the System unit” and providing appropriate facilities 
at “reasonable rates,” taking into account the experience and +nancial 
capability of the entity submitting a proposal, as well as the subordinate 
consideration of the fees to be received by the United States.196 The Act 
further limits the term of such concessions contracts from !* years to a 
general rule of #* years or less, but up to (* years if the longer term is needed 
for the “required construction of capital improvements.”197 
Relevant to this litigation, the #%%& Act replaced concessioners’ 
“possessory interest” and its valuation formula with a “leasehold surrender 
interest” and a more straightforward valuation formula.198 The leasehold 
surrender interest gives the concessioner “a right to compensation for the 
capital improvement to the extent of the value of the concessioner’s leasehold 
surrender interest,” which would be determined by a formula set forth in the 
statute.199 However, title to any capital improvements in the National Park 
System “shall be vested in the United States.”200 The Act created a National 
Park Service Concessions Management Advisory Board,201 and provides rules 
for approval of fees and rates to be charged by the concessioners.202 However, 
legacy contracts entered into prior to #%%& remain governed by certain 
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provisions of the #%$' Act in certain circumstances, including those relating 
to the possessory interest.203 
Delaware North thus asserted that the trademarks were “intangible 
property” in which it held a possessory interest, that it had been required to 
purchase this intangible property when it took over as concessioner from 
YP&CC, and that it was thus entitled to compensation from its successor.204 
It valued the trademarks and other intangible property at “no less than -"" 
million.”205 
In response, the NPS alleged that Delaware North did not in fact own 
these trademarks and that Delaware North had misled the United States 
Patent and Trademark O.ce (USPTO) in applying for the marks in the +rst 
place. Speci+cally, in its responses to the Complaint and First Amended 
Complaint, the NPS asserted that at Yosemite National Park, “all of the 
hotels, restaurants and recreational infrastructure, known as Concession 
Facilities, are owned by the United States,” an arrangement that spares the 
private concessioners from paying property taxes.206 The NPS asserted that 
in its #%%(/%! proposal for a concession contract, Delaware North noti+ed the 
NPS of its intention to develop a “Yosemite National Park logo” which would 
be trademarked, and that Delaware North represented that it “would go 
forward with the program only with full [National Park Foundation] 
approval.”207 The NPS alleged, however, that Delaware North “never sought 
approval” from it or from the National Park Foundation208 with respect to its 
proposed trademarks “or even advised the NPS of the program directly.”209 
Instead, according to the NPS: 
in *++*, without providing notice to NPS of its intent to do so, Delaware 
North "led applications with the United States Patent and Trademark O&ce 
(USPTO) to register serval trademarks related to properties owned by the 
United States at Yosemite. These included applications to register trademarks 
for the phrase “Yosemite National Park,” and for the names of iconic hotels 
 
203 See '& U.S.C. § $#$%$'(c) (governing contracts entered into prior to Nov. $!, $%%), and 
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and recreation areas, including “The Ahwahnee,” “Wawona,” “Yosemite 
Lodge,” “Badger Pass,” and “Curry Village.210 
The NPS noted that “Ahwahnee” is the name of the “historic hotel 
commissioned by the NPS in #%('–#%() to accommodate tourism in Yosemite 
National Park,” and that the hotel was designated as a National Historic 
Landmark in #%&).211 The Wawona Hotel was built in #&)$, and renamed 
“Wawona” in #&&!.212 The Wawona was designated a National Historic 
Landmark in #%&) as well.213 Curry Village is a “historic tent and rustic 
lodging facility” in Yosemite that “carries the namesake of the original 
concessioners of the facility, David Curry and Jenny Foster Curry.”214 The 
name of the village changed from “Camp Curry” to “Curry Village” in #%)* 
and the facilities were added to the National Register of Historic Places in 
#%)%.215 Badger Pass is a ski area within Yosemite National Park, but is not a 
historic landmark.216 At each of these facilities, commercial services, 
including lodging, food and beverage, and related services, are provided to 
tourists by third-party private concessioners operating “under contract with 
the NPS.”217 
In perhaps its greatest show of chutzpah, in (**(, Delaware North applied 
to the USPTO to trademark the name “Yosemite National Park” itself.218 
Several months later, the USPTO rejected Delaware North’s application “in 
part, because the trademark would have presented a false association between 
Delaware North and the NPS.”219 The examiner determined that “‘Yosemite 
National Park’ identi+es the National Park Service, and Yosemite National 
Park ‘is an extremely famous national park.’”220 The NPS answer alleged that 
to counter this conclusion of a false association, Delaware North submitted 
three pages of its concession contract with the NPS, while redacting text 
demonstrating both the NPS’s control over merchandise and services within 
the Park, as well as the limited lifetime of the concession contract itself.221 
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Subsequently, the USPTO “reversed its earlier ruling rejecting [Delaware 
North]’s petition” for this trademark.222 
While the litigation was pending, Scott Gediman, the NPS Assistant 
Superintendent for Public and Legislative A,airs stated to the press, “[w]e 
feel Half Dome and El Capitan and the Ahwahnee Hotel (and other 
trademarked names at Yosemite) are part of the national park’s fabric. We feel 
those names are inextricably linked with Yosemite . . . and ultimately belong 
to the American people.”223 Notwithstanding this statement, the NPS 
temporarily changed the names of the properties at issue in the litigation in 
Yosemite National Park.224 During the pendency of the litigation, the NPS 
renamed the Wawona Hotel the “Big Trees Lodge” and the Ahwahnee Hotel 
the “Majestic Yosemite Hotel.” Curry Village became “Half Dome Village,” 
and Badger Pass Ski Area became the “Yosemite Ski & Snowboard Area.”225 
The NPS contended that it did this to avoid any claim that it was infringing 
upon the disputed trademarks until the matter was resolved.226 Delaware 
North alleged, in contrast, that the NPS had “devised and implemented a 
plan to change the iconic names of properties in Yosemite” in order to “drive 
down the value” of the trademarks and to “create a public outcry that would 
force [Delaware North] to relinquish” its intangible property at less than fair 
market value.227 
Indeed, a public outcry did follow these name changes.228 The NPS 
changed the names suddenly and without warning. In some cases, the iconic 
names were simply covered over with tape.229 Guests at the hotels reportedly 
removed some of the tape in “protest.”230 The Washington Post reported that 
while anywhere else this would be a simple trademark dispute, in Yosemite 
“it’s being perceived as an a,ront to the entire point of preserving nature for 
public use.”231 Alfred Runte, historian of the park, commented, “Delaware 
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North has seen a way to create a poison pill to discourage other would-be 
bidders,” and called e,orts to trademark the historic names “ludicrous.”232 
Ultimately, in (*#%, the parties settled the lawsuit.233 Under the terms of 
the settlement, the NPS paid Delaware North approximately -!.&" million 
and Aramark paid -&.#$ million for its intangible property.234 Aramark was 
permitted to use the historic names during the pendency of its concession 
contract, and at the end of the concession contract, the names would revert 
to the full control of the NPS.235 Future concession agreements will make 
clear that private +rms cannot own the trademarks or names of features of 
the parks.236 Upon the announcement of the settlement, Gediman stated: 
“I’ve said from literally Day One that these names belong with these places, 
and ultimately belong to the American people.”237 When the tape and tarps 
were +nally removed to reveal the original names after the settlement was 
announced, according to Gediman, “[p]eople were crying.”238 
The irony, of course, is that while members of the public were outraged 
at the idea that a private corporation could “own” the name of a historic 
landmarked property in a national park, these hotels were built and run by 
private companies for their entire lifespan. The Ahwahnee Hotel was built 
between #%(' and #%() by the Yosemite Park & Curry Company.239 In the 
#%&$ Nomination Form to place the Ahwahnee Hotel on the National 
Register of Historic Places, the Architectural Historian of the National Park 
Service, Southwest Region,240 classi+ed the building as privately owned, and 
listed the owner of the property as the Yosemite Park & Curry Company.241 
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Despite this legal statement regarding the hotel’s ownership, the Historic 
Landmark application form concludes by stating 
Perhaps more important than the list of dignitaries and famous people who 
have spent time in the Ahwahnee is the hotel’s place as the heart of the 
aesthetic idea of Yosemite. The magni"cent scenery of the valley is enhanced 
by the building’s artful contributions to the ambience of the Yosemite 
experience.242 
Over the years, the hotel became identi+ed with the publicness of 
Yosemite itself. 
In (*#", while this dispute was brewing, Congress amended the law to 
make clear that, notwithstanding trademark law, buildings and structures “on 
or eligible for inclusion on the National Register” or otherwise having 
landmark status may “retain the name historically associated with the building 
or structure.”243 The prior version of this statute, which was in e,ect from 
(*** to (*#", had not made clear that this ability to retain the name was 
“notwithstanding . . . the Trademark Act.”244 The settlement likewise made 
clear that private concessioners could not own trademarks to historic names 
of features within the parks going forward, and that e,orts to seek trademarks 
without permission from the NPS would result in the concessioner being 
barred from future government contracts.245 
Concerned about this dispute over landmarked properties in Yosemite, in 
(*#$, the State of California adopted analogous legislation to address this 
issue going forward. The California Heritage Protection Act, AB (("%, 
prohibits concessioners in the state parks from registering trademarks in 
historic place names and requires any concessioner who seeks to do so to 
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forfeit the right to bid on future state park concession contracts.246 In the 
statute’s recitals, the law expressly mentions the many historic sites in 
Yosemite, including the Ahwahnee and Wawona Hotels.247 The recitals 
provide a rationale for the law: 
California state park venues are held in public trust for the people of 
California. A legal claim by an individual to have a trademark right to a name 
or names associated with a venue within a state park derogates the interests 
of California and the shared history of Californians, and it is indicative of a 
lack of the individual’s "tness to serve as a steward of the state’s cherished 
cultural heritage and places.248 
Thus, California concluded that such venues are part of the public trust of 
the state, and that the mere intention to seek pro+t through privatization of 
this public good warrants debarment from future concession contracts.249 
Perhaps this historic association forms the basis of the claim that the 
names are themselves part of the public trust, just like the mountains and 
natural features of the Valley. Joseph Sax has argued that the public trust 
doctrine applies to the “greatest artifacts of our civilization,” which must be 
protected against private e,orts to destroy or withhold these treasures from 
the public.250 While the language of public trust is used colloquially here, it 
is not clear that ownership of a name implicates the concerns of the public 
trust doctrine in the same way as physical ownership of land. The private +rm 
did not seek to destroy the hotel or exclude members of the public from 
staying there, nor could it, as the physical asset is owned by the United States. 
While private ownership of these names could never exclude members of 
the public from staying at the hotel, visiting the park, or enjoying its splendor, 
this dispute over an intangible property right nonetheless took on a similar 
character to early disputes about the appropriateness of private corporate 
activity within the parks. The current dispute raises concerns about whether 
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private corporations can remove names that are deeply associated with the 
parks from the public domain and call them private. There is no question that 
nothing was physically extracted from the parks to be sold in markets during 
this dispute. Perhaps the harm here is that Delaware North sought to extract 
some intangible, public goodwill that has long been associated with the name 
of the hotel. The +rm’s outrage at the NPS decision to change the names 
during the pendency of the litigation, and thus perhaps to drive down their 
value, is evidence of this desire to pro+t from public goodwill. By seeking to 
commoditize the name of the hotel (and the park itself) for private gain 
(namely to sell it to the next concessioner if Delaware North did not receive 
a contract extension), the private +rm crossed a line similar to that of private 
+rms seeking to extract and sell timber from the parks. It is merely a di,erent, 
less tangible form of interference with the publicness of the parks. 
B. Corporate Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing  
The second set of non-extractive corporate interactions with the parks is 
formal corporate philanthropy, including co-branding and cause-related 
marketing. Like the dispute over trademarks, these relationships do not 
physically harm the parks or physically extract a commodity for sale in private 
markets. Nonetheless, they implicate questions of how much corporate 
activity in the parks is too much, and where the boundary ought to be drawn 
between public and private. 
#. Corporate Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing Generally 
Corporate giving and marketing for the bene+t of a non-pro+t or public 
organization can take many forms. Philanthropy includes direct contributions 
to organizations by corporations or their related foundations.251 Co-branding 
is a marketing strategy that combines the use of multiple brand names to 
build on the strength of both brands. In some cases, both of the brands are 
private +rms like Pottery Barn (home furnishings) and Sherwin-Williams 
(paints),252 or Taco Bell and Frito-Lay’s Doritos (which generated the Doritos 
Locos Taco).253 In other cases, the co-branding strategy involves a corporate 
brand and a nonpro+t entity that allows the +rm to promote a corporate social 
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responsibility initiative.254 This type of co-branding is sometimes referred to 
as “cause marketing” or “cause-related marketing.”255 
There are many well-known examples of cause-related marketing 
campaigns in which a corporation partners with a non-pro+t or charitable 
organization to raise money for the charity while raising brand awareness for 
the corporate partner. One example is American Express’s e,orts to raise 
money for the restoration of the Statue of Liberty.256 During the fourth 
quarter of #%&!, the +rm donated one cent to the restoration e,orts each time 
an American Express card was used.257 The e,ort raised -#.) million dollars 
for the restoration and the +rm reported that usage of its card increased by 
thirty percent during that quarter, although it was not possible to attribute 
all of that increase to the marketing campaign.258 Another signi+cant cause-
related marketing example is Bank of America’s support for the Susan G. 
Komen Foundation, which raises money for breast cancer research.259 Bank 
of America has pledged to donate to the Foundation for each new Susan G. 
Komen Cash Rewards Card opened and used for purchases.260 Since (**%, 
the campaign has raised over -%.' million for the cause.261 
Cause-related marketing can also include in-kind donations. For example, 
since (**$, Pampers, a unit of Proctor & Gamble (P&G), has partnered with 
UNICEF to donate one tetanus vaccination for each pack of Pampers 
purchased (its # Pack 0 # Vaccine campaign).262 To date, through this 
campaign, P&G has donated !** million doses of the vaccine globally.263 
Other +rms, like the outdoor retailer Patagonia, engage in projects that are 
ongoing, rather than time-limited. Since #%&', pursuant to its #% for the 
Planet campaign, Patagonia has pledged to donate #% of its pro+ts (totaling 
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more than -&% million to date), to support “domestic and international 
grassroots environmental groups.”264 
(. Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing in the National Parks 
The NPS accepts both monetary and in-kind donations through its o.cial 
charitable partner, the National Park Foundation (NPF).265 Corporate 
partners can engage with the NPF in multiple ways that, according to the 
NPF, “not only contribute to the NPF’s mission but also provide sales, 
marketing and/or promotional value to our partners.”266 These forms of 
engagement include licensing, philanthropy, cause-related marketing, 
program or event sponsorship, and in-kind support.267 The NPS has a long 
history of receiving private philanthropy. In its earliest years, wealthy 
individuals like the Rockefellers, the Dorrs, the Mellons, the Kents, and the 
duPonts, along with their family foundations, donated land or money to 
create parks and museums, or to construct roads and visitor centers now under 
the control of the NPS.268 While individuals and family or institutional 
foundations remain signi+cant donors to the parks, corporations are now also 
actively participating in this space.269 Indeed, for +scal year (*#&, while 
individuals and family foundations donated a total of -!".! million to the 
parks, corporations contributed -!#.# million.270 
With respect to licensing, the NPF explains that commercial use of the 
NPF or NPS trademarked logos is “expressly prohibited unless the producer 
completes a license agreement” with the NPF.271 Cause-related marketing 
both bene+ts the parks and o,ers +rms “integrated-marketing campaigns that 
enable corporations to leverage the popularity of America’s national parks to 
support corporate initiatives while helping increase public awareness and 
funding.”272 Philanthropy allows +rms to meet their “corporate responsibility 
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goals.”273 Finally, business +rms can “direct their sponsorship to a speci+c 
NPF program or event,”274 such as programs to increase trail accessibility and 
reduce erosion, to protect and restore ocean wildlife in Alaska, or to improve 
student engagement at speci+c parks.275 
The NPF has many corporate donors, some having provided more than 
-# million to date in support of the parks. Subaru, for example, has provided 
more than -(* million in support since (*#!, and has shared expertise on a 
zero-land+ll initiative that has helped the parks to eliminate more than $ 
million pounds of waste.276 Other donors contributing more than -# million 
to the parks include American Express, Budweiser, Coca-Cola, Hanes, L.L. 
Bean, Nature Valley, Nissan, and Union Paci+c Railroad.277 Major donors 
contributing between -'**,*** and -%%%,%%% include Boeing and Winnebago 
Industries.278 There are many additional business +rms that contribute smaller 
amounts to the NPF, including both national brands and smaller local brands.279 
Congress has authorized the NPS to accept “money that may be donated 
for the purposes of the [Park] System.”280 In (*#", Congress enacted 
legislation governing the proper scope of national park donor 
acknowledgment.281 That statute permits the NPS to recognize a donor to the 
national parks in certain speci+ed ways.282 However, no donor may be 
recognized as “an o.cial sponsor” of the NPS or the National Park System.283 
Nor may any donor state or imply NPS endorsement of a donor’s product or 
service.284 Further, despite concerns about naming the parks after corporate 
sponsors, Congress has expressly provided that no donor can be 
acknowledged in the naming of any unit of the National Park System or even 
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a facility within the parks, such as a visitor center.285 This statute, however, 
leaves discretion for the NPS to permit other forms of corporate 
acknowledgment within the parks. Indeed, the (*#$ update to NPS Director’s 
Order 1(#286 gave an expansive interpretation of this NPS discretion, leading 
some critics to decry the expansion of naming rights for corporations within 
the national parks for 
interpretive and digital media (exhibits, waysides, and audiovisual 
productions); donor recognition boards and walls; plaques or nameplates; 
donor books; paving stones and park furnishings; on or inside a park visitor 
center or administrative facility; outside a visitor or administrative facility 
(including bench or other park furnishings, brick, pathway, area of 
landscaping, or plaza); near a park construction or restoration project (when 
related to the project); and limited opportunities for naming interior spaces, 
and NPS positions, programs, endowments.287 
With respect to such acknowledgment of corporate donations, the 
Director of the NPS must expressly authorize the installation of any 
monument or other “commemorative installation” in a park area.288 And 
federal regulations prohibit the display and distribution of any “[c]ommercial 
notices or advertisements” on federally owned or controlled land within a 
park area without prior written permission of the speci+c Park 
Superintendent, who may grant such permission only if the notices are found 
to be “desirable and necessary for the convenience and guidance of the public.”289 
Special rules exist for the Arrowhead Symbol, which has been the o.cial 
insignia of the NPS since #%$(, and the Parkscape Symbol, which is the 
“o.cial tie tack or pin to be worn by all National Park Service uniformed 
employees.”290 The Director of the NPS may authorize the “reproduction, 
manufacture, sale, and use” of these two symbols for “uses that will contribute 
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to purposes of education and conservation as they relate to the program of 
the National Park Service. All other uses are prohibited.”291 Such permission 
can be revoked if later found to be “injurious to their integrity” or 
inconsistent with the NPS programs of “conservation and recreation.”292 
Penalties for violation of these laws include a +ne, imprisonment for up to six 
months, or both.293 
Director’s Order 1(# sets forth several additional “negative-screen” 
limitations on philanthropy and cause-related marketing in the parks. For 
example, the Order states that the NPS will not accept donations from 
organizations in which an NPS employee is an o.cer or director,294 from a 
party engaged in litigation with the NPS,295 or from a current concessioner 
or those seeking a contract.296 The NPS may not engage in fundraising that 
“identi+es the NPS with tobacco or any type of illegal product,”297 or that 
would “generate controversy, harm public con+dence, or associate the NPS 
with products that are inconsistent with [the NPS] mission.”298 Finally, the 
NPS “should only agree to a cause marketing campaign when the relationship 
strengthens its assets and brand.”299 
!. Corporate Cause-Related Marketing in State Parks 
In addition to philanthropic donations to the parks by national 
corporations, +rms engage in other creative ways to provide funds to national 
and state parks. State parks have innovated in this regard with local 
businesses and have taken di,erent approaches including partnerships and 
cause-related marketing with local breweries, wineries, and other businesses 
that donate a portion of proceeds from sales or events to the parks. 
Because this Article thus far has focused on national parks, it is worth 
pausing for a moment to note that the state parks are experiencing some of 
the same challenges. State parks generate approximately (.' times as many 
visits annually as the national parks.300 While visits to the national parks 
increased to more than !!* million in (*#), in that same year, visits to state 
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parks reached &*) million.301 The &*) million visits in (*#) represented a 
('.$% increase since #%&", while the !** million visits to national parks 
represented a !!% increase over the same time period.302 During this time of 
signi+cant increases in visitation, funding allocated to the state parks 
nationwide decreased from a peak of -!.)" billion in (**$ to -(.'% billion in 
(*#).303 Costs of managing the increasing numbers of visitors have not 
remained stable. In addition to ordinary maintenance from wear and tear, the 
parks face new challenges like climate change, which will likely alter visitation 
rates. Indeed, research suggests that visits will increase as ambient 
temperatures increase, up to a point.304 
An increasing number of visitors combined with declining state 
appropriations to the parks has led some state park management agencies to 
seek funds from other sources, including through “entrance fees, permits, 
[and] donations.”305 Smith et al. note that in addition to increasing entrance 
fees, state park management agencies have implemented “innovative 
solutions” like “direct funding of individual state park units by corporations 
within the outdoor recreation industry;” sales of “unique license plates” that 
act as annual entrance permits; and “partnering with local communities in 
comanagement arrangements.”306 
States have developed various rules governing these corporate 
philanthropic and cause-related marketing programs. These rules lie along a 
spectrum of comfort with corporate partnerships and acknowledgments. At 
the more restrictive end of the spectrum is the State of California, which 
employs a positive screen on philanthropy and cause-related marketing. 
California permits as corporate sponsors only those corporations whose 
missions share a “nexus” with the values that the California parks system 
seeks to promote, including a “particular emphasis on programs promoting 
environmental, historical and cultural awareness, healthful living, education, 
and high-quality outdoor recreation.”307 And California makes clear that, 
based on the “goals, mission, and identity of California State Parks,” park 
administrators “could justify prohibiting partnerships with those 
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organizations and companies that are inconsistent with this purpose.”308 
Thus, major California “Proud Partners” who “align themselves” with an 
individual park or region and provide +nancial support include the Save the 
Redwoods League, Sur/ine, Jack’s Sur2oards, the Smithsonian Institution, 
and Easy(Hike.309 
At the other end of the spectrum of comfort with corporate partnerships 
is the State of Tennessee. Tennessee has entered into a creative cause-related 
marketing arrangement with a local brewery.310 The State has authorized 
Tennessee Brew Works (TBW) to use the marketing label “State Park Blonde 
Ale” on one of its beers in exchange for the donation of a portion of the 
proceeds to bene+t the Tennessee State Parks.311 According to Morgan 
Gilman, the Director of Revenue and Guest Experience for the Tennessee 
State Parks, informal discussions about the arrangement began four or +ve 
years ago when TBW opened in Nashville: “The owners of the brewery were 
very passionate about the environment, and about giving back to the state 
parks. We began discussions with them about how to create a beer that would 
give back to state parks.”312 Gilman noted that while other breweries in the 
state had previously supported one park or created a “limited” release, this 
was the +rst e,ort to create an agreement to support the state park system as 
a whole.313 
The program launched in the summer of (*#). Under the agreement, for 
each case of State Park Blonde Ale sold, TBW donates +fty cents to the 
Tennessee State Park Conservancy, a '*#(c)(!) non-pro+t entity that accepts 
donations on behalf of the Tennessee state parks.314 TBW has partnered with 
its distributors to match that donation. In total, the Tennessee state parks 
receive one dollar per case sold.315 In exchange, Randy Hedgepath, the 
Tennessee State Naturalist, “agreed to allow the Brewery to use a drawing of 
his likeness wearing what resembles a state park Ranger hat on the beer bottle 
and packaging.”316 In addition, according to Associate Counsel for the 
 
308 Id. 
309 Proud Partners and Financial Support Programs, CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, 
https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id2"&&$* [https://perma.cc/YUX%-NPGV]. 
310 Telephone Interview with Morgan Gilman, Dir. of Revenue & Guest Experience, Tenn. 
State Parks & Will Kerby, Assoc. Counsel, Tenn. State Parks (Nov. "$, "#$%) (notes on +le with 
author) [hereinafter Gilman & Kerby Interview]; Telephone Interview with Christian Spears, 
Founder and President, Tenn. Brew Works (Nov. "$, "#$%) (notes on +le with author) [hereinafter 
Spears Interview]. 
311 See supra sources cited note !$#. 




316 Id. An image of the beer bottle is available online. State Park Blonde, TENN. BREW WORKS, 
https://www.tnbrew.com/beer/stateparkblonde [https://perma.cc/GP%'-E*JT]. 
&$ University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. #$%: !! 
Tennessee State Parks Will Kerby, the state agreed that TBW could place an 
image of the Tennessee State Parks o.cial logo on the bottle and packaging 
to “show a charitable relationship and that donations are going to the 
Tennessee State Parks Conservancy.”317 He elaborated, “[t]hat is the only 
o.cial image that the Brewery is permitted to use. We determined that the 
use of the logo in this limited fashion was appropriate in light of the 
relationship” under the particular agreement between the parties, “because it 
is not used in the branding of the product” but rather to “indicate a charitable 
relationship.”318 Importantly, the o.cials from the State Parks made clear that 
this relationship with TBW is not exclusive; it is not the sole “o.cial partner” 
of the parks. Indeed, the state parks would work with other private entities 
who sought to enter into similar charitable relationships to raise funds.319 
Since July (*#), the TBW-Tennessee relationship has raised approximately 
-#$,*** for the Tennessee state parks.320 
From the perspective of Christian Spears, the founder and President of 
Tennessee Brew Works, the State Park Blonde Ale partnership was not only 
a way to promote the state parks speci+cally, but also a way to “launch our 
all-Tennessee sourced grains initiative . . . . Spirits are the number one export 
for Tennessee and breweries are the fastest growing industry. We want to 
develop a new cash crop for Tennessee.”321 TBW is not a bene+t corporation 
under state law or a certi+ed B-Corp, but a for-pro+t LLC that nonetheless 
has “a strong mission to bene+t the community.”322 
Other states have entered into similar cause-related marketing 
agreements to bene+t their parks. For example, the Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) created the “Goods for Good” program.323 In 
(**", the Michigan DNR lost all general revenue support from the state.324 
The DNR runs the parks “like a business” by using campground fees to 
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support the parks. However, the parks still have a signi+cant infrastructure 
de+cit.325 According to Maia Turek, Resource Development Specialist at 
DNR Parks and Recreation, the Goods for Good program began about six 
years ago.326 The goal is not only to raise money to run the parks, but to do 
so by “increasing awareness about the state parks without spending any 
advertising dollars.”327 
The +rst program created by the DNR under the program was “Wines 
for the Outdoors” in (*#'—a program open to any business with statewide 
distribution.328 Chateau Grand Traverse was the +rst partner and has created 
three “custom-labeled” wines for which +fty percent of net pro+ts go to 
bene+t the state park system.329 The program allows state residents to vote 
on how the proceeds of wine sales should be spent: to repair trails, to promote 
accessibility, or to replace trees.330 The winery does not dictate the use of the 
funds. A second partner under the Goods for Good program umbrella is 
Espresso Royale, a co,ee roaster, which created the “Love Our Parks, Love 
Our Co,ee” program in partnership with the DNR.331 A portion of proceeds 
is donated to the parks.332 In addition, the DNR partnered with New Holland 
Brewing, which partnered with REI Co-op, Merrell, and Woosah Out+tters, 
to “craft Lake and Trail Lager, a copper lager that according to the brewery is 
perfect for drinking after a day of hiking Michigan’s scenic state park trails.”333 
Other businesses sell candles, bug spray, and athletic gear to support the parks 
under this program. The State has also partnered with small entities that wish 
to support a single local park, rather than the state park system as a whole.334 
Michigan also has created a program called Tourism Cares, which supports 
restoration projects in the state parks. Firms and their employees can 
participate in short-term restoration projects through this program. The 
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the parks.335 In (*#%, these various partnerships and programs raised 
approximately -#'*,*** for the state parks.336 
A key concern on the part of the Michigan DNR is raising funds without 
compromising the publicness of the parks. As Turek explained: “[W]e don’t 
want marked parks or named parks with corporate names. We have to set 
limits for public lands.”337 Thus, while state parks recognize the +nancial and 
in-kind support they receive from corporate partnerships, even those states 
with the fewest restrictions, such as Tennessee and Michigan, recognize the 
importance of preserving the publicness of the parks. 
Local corporate initiatives tend to have more public support than 
sponsorships by national corporations. There is a small empirical literature 
on public reactions to corporate sponsorship of state and local parks that bears 
this out. For example, one study found that members of the public were more 
supportive of local business +rms +nancially sponsoring the parks than 
national corporations.338 The study asked participants about twenty-two 
di,erent types of promotional activities between a corporation and a local 
park, varying whether the sponsor was a local or national business, whether 
there was o,-site or on-site recognition of the sponsor, and whether the 
amount of the sponsorship to the park was small (-#,***) or large 
(-'**,***).339 The results demonstrated that a signi+cant majority ()#%) 
perceived corporate sponsorship of public-sector parks and recreation 
favorably.340 However, sponsorships by local businesses were perceived more 
favorably than those by national corporations. And, importantly, sponsorships 
that included on-site recognition of the corporation in the title of the park 
and recreation facilities, as well as exclusive sponsorship contracts, among 
others, were perceived to be least appropriate.341 These perceptions seem 
largely consistent with the regulations and guidance that govern corporate 
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regulations and guidance eschew exclusive sponsorship arrangements, naming 
rights, and associations with +rms in “undesirable” industries like tobacco 
that could tarnish the parks’ positive reputations or diminish the publicness 
of the parks in some fashion. 
To summarize, the case of corporate philanthropy and cause-related 
marketing raises similar issues as the cases of corporate ownership of names 
of historic landmarks within the parks and concessions more broadly. In each 
case, the parks bene+t in some way from the corporate activity—they receive 
necessary services (such as lodging and food for visitors), or cash and in-kind 
donations (in the case of corporate philanthropy and cause-related 
marketing). They can use these funds and services to improve or restore the 
parks themselves. And it is often, though not always, the parks or the public, 
rather than the +rms, that de+ne the agenda of what the money will do—
whether that is through a competitive bid for a concession contract written 
by the NPS, or the procedure whereby members of the Michigan public 
decide whether donated funds should go toward trail repair, promote 
accessibility, or plant trees. The +rms bene+t as well by associating with the 
parks and their positive image. Yet the parks can su,er harm as well—some 
aspect of public goodwill is lost even if nothing is physically removed and the 
trails and public access are improved, rather than harmed. And if it is the 
corporate donor who dictates how the funds must be used, this can raise 
additional concerns about democratic legitimacy. The next Part takes up the 
normative questions of the bene+ts and harms of these non-extractive 
corporate activities within the parks. 
IV. THE BENEFITS AND HARMS OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY WITHIN 
THE PARKS 
This Part o,ers a normative account of non-extractive corporate activities 
within the parks. It +rst explores the business and management literature 
regarding corporate marketing to understand why, from the perspective of 
the corporation, these relationships are valuable. It then examines the actual 
and potential impact of these corporate activities on the parks themselves, 
drawing on literature regarding corporate philanthropy, corporate 
associations with nonpro+t organizations, and greenwashing. 
A. Bene!ts to Corporations from Relationships with the Parks 
Corporations choose to engage in for-pro+t concessions activities, 
marketing, or philanthropic activity in the national parks for four primary 
reasons: (#) purely philanthropic intent to do good; (() strategic intent to 
pro+t, including by increasing brand awareness in target populations, 
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improving brand perception through positive associations (a “halo e,ect”) 
with the goodwill of the parks, or by in/uencing park policies and actions in 
ways that bene+t the donor; (!) a devious intent to provide a veneer of doing 
good to enhance the +rm’s reputation and conceal or minimize the e,ect of 
other bad behavior, otherwise known as greenwashing; or (") some 
combination of these motivations. To date, there has been no in-depth 
consideration within legal scholarship of the social science literature on the 
implications of such corporate actions, for either the +rms or the parks as the 
recipients of +rm philanthropy and marketing. There is, however, a 
signi+cant literature within marketing, management, and business ethics 
scholarship on these topics. This literature helps to unpack both the 
motivations for and implications of these corporate activities. This section 
explores each potential motivation in turn. 
Firms may engage in some aspects of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) with purely good intentions—simply to do good. The literature on 
CSR refers to “political” CSR (as opposed to “strategic” CSR) as corporate 
activity that seeks to address or solve a social problem—whether for 
principled or pragmatic reasons.342 Indeed, it was this form of corporate social 
responsibility that so troubled economist Milton Friedman, who argued that 
corporate actions that promote “general social interest[s]” impose an 
unrepresentative tax on shareholders.343 Yet, to the extent that +rms market 
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their philanthropy rather than donate anonymously, even the least skeptical 
observer would seek other explanations or at least +nd mixed motivations. 
The remaining motivations are based at least in part in strategic 
considerations.344 As a general matter, because public sector organizations are 
“relatively uncluttered” with multiple competitors, such marketing 
sponsorships can be especially valuable to +rms.345 One strategic reason to 
engage in corporate activity within the parks (be it through concessions, 
philanthropy, or cause-related marketing), is that it can be bene+cial to +rms 
to create brand awareness in their target populations. For example, it is 
bene+cial for +rms like Patagonia, L.L. Bean, and North Face that sell 
outdoor recreation-related products to market their association with the parks 
to a population that will buy their products. This explains why +rms like L.L. 
Bean are major corporate sponsors to the national parks.346 
But what about +rms that do not sell speci+c outdoor-recreation-related 
products? Some of the biggest corporate donors to the national parks include 
Subaru, American Express, Budweiser, Coca-Cola, Hanes, and Nissan, 
among others.347 While one could make an argument that each of these +rms 
sells products that enable potential customers to enjoy the parks, the links are 
more attenuated than for L.L. Bean or Patagonia. Arguably, +rms with only 
attenuated relationships to the parks seek to build more general awareness of 
their brands and to generate a “halo e,ect” by associating their brands with 
the goodwill of the national parks.348 The marketing literature refers to this 
as building “brand equity.”349 
Empirical scholarship has demonstrated that e,ective CSR campaigns, in 
some contexts, not only create a “benevolent halo” regarding the +rm’s 
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general reputation, but also lead consumers to view the company’s products 
more favorably.350 This boost in perceptions of product performance is 
present even when the acts of CSR are “unrelated to the company’s core 
business,” and even when actual product performance is “readily observable 
and consumers can directly experience the product.”351 However, the 
literature also demonstrates that when consumers believe that +rms’ actions 
are motivated by “self-interest rather than benevolence,” there is no such 
bene+t.352 Several studies have suggested that the mechanism underlying this 
e,ect relates to moral judgments formed by consumers about +rms engaging 
in CSR353 and the congruence or lack thereof between the +rm’s motivation 
and the consumers’ own views about the importance of CSR and the role of 
business in society. 354 
In one well-known study, Alexander Chernev and Sean Blair undertook 
four experiments to test when a fictitious firm engaging in some form of CSR 
was able to attain a “halo effect” for its products. In each experiment, 
participants could observe product performance directly: the taste of wine; 
photos of a man’s scalp before and after a hair-loss treatment; photos of teeth 
before and after the use of a whitening product; and the “sharpness” of text that 
a fictitious software firm used to scan and digitize books.355 In each experiment, 
the authors provided some of the test subjects with information about the firm’s 
charitable giving/CSR, while control subjects did not receive this information. 
In the +rst experiment, participants who received information about a 
+ctitious winery’s CSR concluded that the wine tasted better than those who 
received no information about CSR.356 The perceived e,ect was larger when 
the participants were not experts in wine tasting, as the experts were better 
able to evaluate objectively the taste of the wine “based on [its] intrinsic 
characteristics.”357 In the second study, which concerned the hair loss 
treatment product, participants were primed with information stating either 
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that companies donate to charity because “they believe it is the moral thing 
to do” (benevolence/moral reasons) or “because they want the publicity” 
(sel+sh reasons). Participants were then asked what they thought about 
companies that make donations for either “moral” or “sel+sh” reasons.358 Half 
of the participants were then given information about the company’s 
signi+cant donations to charities.359 Finally, all of the participants were asked 
to evaluate how e,ective a hair-loss treatment was by examining before-and-
after photos.360 The authors observed an interaction e,ect for those 
participants exposed to the corporate benevolence/moral message and 
informed about the +rm’s charitable donations: these participants rated the 
hair-loss treatment as more e,ective.361 In contrast, those who were informed 
about the +rm’s charitable donations primed with a message about corporate 
sel+shness/publicity did not perceive the treatment to be more e,ective than 
the control group, who were not provided any information about the +rm’s 
charitable donations.362 In other words, “the positive halo of corporate social 
responsibility can be weakened in cases when consumers believe that the +rm 
is motivated by self-interest rather than benevolence.”363 
Chernev and Blair’s third experiment tested whether the source of the 
information about the +rm’s charitable giving mattered, altering whether this 
information came from the +rm itself or an independent third party, like a 
news source.364 The aim of this test was to assess how skeptical consumers are 
about the motivation of a +rm that makes self-serving statements in 
advertising its CSR. The experiment demonstrated a second interaction 
e,ect: consumers who learned information about a +rm’s charitable giving 
from an independent source rated the tooth-whitening treatment as more 
e,ective than the control group (those who did not receive information about 
the +rm’s CSR at all).365 However, participants who learned about the +rm’s 
CSR from the !rm’s own advertising rated the treatment as essentially as the 
same as the control group (those who did not receive any information about 
the +rm’s CSR).366 As in the second experiment, the +rm’s perceived 
motivation for engaging in CSR a,ected whether consumers rated the 
products more highly. 
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The fourth experiment attempted to test whether a participant’s 
underlying views about the importance of +rms “giving back to society” 
a,ected the impact of +rm motivation on perceptions of product 
performance.367 The participants who “believed more strongly in the 
importance of social goodwill” and who were also primed with information 
about the +rm’s benevolent motive for its CSR concluded that the scanning 
technology performed better than those primed with information about the 
+rm’s self-interested motive (which did not match their own).368 For those 
who cared less about the importance of social goodwill and +rms giving back 
to society, the di,erence in the +rm’s motivation was irrelevant to their 
perceptions of product performance.369 In other words, whether the +rm’s 
motivation matters depends on the moral values of the consumers.370 This 
last +nding is consistent with that of Sen and Bhattacharya, who concluded 
that consumer responses to CSR depend upon the degree of perceived 
“overlap” between the +rm’s CSR e,orts and their own character.371 
The lesson for firms here is that there is evidence for firms to undertake 
CSR based on the second (purely strategic) motivation, as well as a mixed 
motivation of doing good and strategically increasing brand awareness. A firm 
that seeks to increase its profits can do so by aligning its “values” with those of 
its customers by making charitable contributions or otherwise participating in 
CSR. In other words, firms can both create economic benefits and benefit 
society.372 However, the firm must “internalize societal values and align its 
motivation with these values.”373 In addition, it is beneficial for a neutral third 
party to speak about the firm’s CSR programs to dampen speculation or 
concern that the firm is simply making self-serving statements in its 
advertising.374 
It is worth noting that some scholars have suggested that consumers perceive 
firm motivations to be more than simply a binary choice between “other-centered” 
and “self-centered.”375 Rather, these motivations can be a combination of either 
values-driven or stakeholder-driven on one axis, and strategic or egoistic on the 
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other.376 The most positive combination is values-driven and strategic, while the 
most negative is stakeholder-driven and egoistic.377 Others have concluded that 
when a brand “positions itself on CSR, integrating CSR with its core business 
strategy,” the firm is more likely to generate long-term customer loyalty than when 
a CSR program is more fleeting.378 
The most cynical explanation for these activities is that they are a form of 
corporate greenwashing. A firm engages in greenwashing when it misleads 
consumers or the broader public about the environmental performance of a 
product or service, or of the firm itself.379 In other words, some corporate 
concessioners and donors provide funds or services to the parks in order to 
boost their public reputation for environmental bona fides, which is not in fact 
genuine. In a clear case of greenwashing outside the national parks context, 
LG Electronics self-certified certain of its refrigerators under the Energy-Star 
label when they did not meet the energy-efficiency standards.380 Other firms 
have used vague claims that their products are “all-natural,” or made accurate 
but irrelevant claims about the environmental benefits of some aspect of a 
product that is minimally important.381 
There is some empirical basis for firms acting on this motivation as well. 
In addition to improving perceptions of product performance, CSR can 
insulate firms from negative word-of-mouth responses when their products or 
services “fail,” if the CSR is both substantial and aligned with consumer 
values.382 The effect is even stronger when firms employ CSR programs that 
allow for consumer “choice” among beneficiaries, as this improves the “value 
alignment” between the consumer and the firm.383 In other words, CSR can 
serve as a “global insurance policy” against product or service failure, but only 
when customers “perceive a high degree of alignment with the firm’s values.”384 
One explanation for this effect is that customers whose values are aligned with 
those of the firm’s CSR program “experience dissonance” if they choose to 
respond in a negative way to a service or product failure if that firm has 
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“facilitated their ability to have a positive impact on society.”385 If, however, a 
customer’s values are not aligned with those of the firm’s CSR, there can be 
an increase in negative word of mouth and negative reaction to a service or 
product failure, as compared to a situation in which there was no CSR in the 
first place.386 It is important to note the limitation of this finding with respect 
to the seriousness of the failures: the service failures in Joireman et al.’s studies 
were an “unusually long wait time and incorrect drink order” at a coffee 
shop.387 They acknowledge that their study did not address the most serious 
types of service failures by firms, such as environmental disasters, defective 
products that cause significant harm, or corporate fraud, for example.388 
B.	 Potential E#ects on the Parks 
With this deeper understanding of what motivates corporations to build 
relationships with the parks, this section explores the impact of these non-
extractive corporate relationships on the parks themselves. When two entities 
are associated with one another, the association has multi-directional impacts. 
There are bene+ts to the parks, but also potential harms. The bene+ts in cash 
and in-kind donations may make it easier for parks to ful+ll their missions. 
Yet each of these corporate interactions can also lead to some loss of 
publicness, often (though not always) in a di,erent way from the concerns 
expressed in the early years. These risks include the risk of co-optation, 
associative risk, a risk of loss of support for public funding of the parks, and 
+nally the risk of public exclusion from enjoyment of the parks. 
#.	 Bene+ts to the Parks 
The bene+ts to the parks are straightforward: the most important is 
+nancial support, which may be extremely valuable to +ll gaps in operating 
budgets. In addition, corporate sponsors can share and transfer expertise to 
the parks, which can increase the e.ciency and scope of their operations. As 
noted earlier, the NPF has received millions of dollars from corporate 
donations, enabling the parks to engage in many signi+cant programs that 
otherwise might not have existed. Philanthropy to the parks has supported 
the digitization of oral histories at the Flight %! National Memorial and 
Stonewall National Monument; awarded millions of dollars in +eld trip 
grants to more than (*** schools, largely from underserved communities; 
supported youth conservation and service corps trips; trained teachers in 
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using the national parks to support their curricula; and enabled children to 
participate in “citizen science” programs at the parks.389 From concessions, 
the national parks receive important services and accommodations for 
visitors, as well as a share of the pro+ts from the concessioners in the form of 
fees. Finally, from cause-related marketing, the parks may be publicized to 
groups of people who have never visited or thought about visiting them. 
(.		Harms to the Parks 
The potential harms and risks of corporate sponsorship and relationships 
with non-profit public sector entities like the parks include (a) the potential for 
co-optation, (b) stigma-by-association, (c) an erosion of support for public 
funding of the parks, and in extreme cases (d) exclusion of the public.390 The 
first three of these are substantively different from the early concerns about 
exclusion and commodification, and operate as more indirect assaults on the 
publicness of the parks. The fourth is more consistent with those early concerns. 
a.	 Co-optation 
The +rst concern is that corporate activity within the parks will lead to 
co-optation of the NPS. In the context of relationships between non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations, Baur and Schmitz 
de+ne co-optation as “the process of aligning NGO interests with those of 
corporations.”391 In other words, powerful groups (often private corporations) 
seek to “water[] down” the interests of the non-pro+t or public sector entity 
to bene+t the private corporation’s interests.392 Co-optation can arise as a 
result of “sponsoring relationships, labeling agreements, and the personal ties 
established with corporate leaders.”393 Research suggests, for example, that 
NGOs that develop relationships with corporations may be less likely to 
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protest the actions of their corporate partners and tend to move to more 
moderate strategies of accommodation.394 
An analog of co-optation in the regulatory context is regulatory capture, 
in which a regulated industry “captures” the regulator through cozy 
relationships and revolving doors in ways that ultimately in/uence policy.395 
The Made in America Outdoor Recreation Advisory Committee could be 
seen as an example of either regulatory capture or co-optation of the NPS, as 
it was largely sta,ed with industry representatives.396 
In the analogous context of donations by wealthy individuals or 
foundations to support government projects or services like education, 
outdoor monuments and parks, health care, or community programs (also 
known as “patriotic philanthropy”), Margaret Lemos and Guy-Uriel Charles 
have suggested the risk that “gifts to government may undermine norms of 
collective self-government by enabling certain individuals—wealthy ones—to 
exert outsized influence on public policy.”397 This can come in the form of 
problematic public decisions (such as a wealthy alumnus’s temporarily 
successful efforts to force the University of North Dakota to keep the name 
and mascot “Fighting Sioux” by offering -#** million to build a new hockey 
arena with the name and logo prominently displayed).  It can also lead to 
decisions that are more redistributive (such as private foundation support for 
public schools serving predominantly African-American children in the South 
when the states did not provide sufficient financial support).398 In other words, 
they posit that “gifts . . . are not entirely free.”399 One dividing line between 
gifts that are more or less problematic is whether the government entity 
continues to define its own goals, and donors may merely contribute to goals 
set through democratic procedures.400 More problematic in this context are 
those situations in which the donor can set the government’s agenda. 
Co-optation can result from corporate sponsorships when the NGO or 
public sector entity becomes dependent upon the resources of the sponsor.401 
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These sponsorship relationships create a new class of stakeholders who are 
important to the non-pro+t organization, and who, according to Baur and 
Schmitz, might crowd out the importance of other stakeholders who do not 
contribute +nancially, including the more di,use bene+ciaries of the NGO’s 
mission.402 
This risk of interference with public decision making is real. One 
prominent example of co-optation in the parks involved Coca-Cola, which 
had donated more than -#! million to the NPF. Coca-Cola objected to the 
NPS’s proposed plan to ban plastic water bottle sales in the Grand Canyon 
National Park.403 At the time, plastic water bottles accounted for 
approximately thirty percent of the waste generated within the parks.404 In 
light of Coca-Cola’s objection, the NPS did not implement the ban.405 After 
public backlash, the NPS reversed its policy and imposed the ban.406 
Subsequent reports demonstrated that the plastic bottle ban “resulted in 
yearly savings of up to two million water bottles.”407 In (*#), the NPS again 
lifted the ban.408 
A second, more normatively ambiguous example involves a donation from 
Delta Airlines of -&!,'** to keep the Martin Luther King, Jr. National 
Historic Park open on the federal holiday bearing King’s name in (*#%.409 At 
the time, the rest of the federal government was shut down. While the public 
has an interest in the parks being open to them, because Delta was able to 
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408 Id.; National Park Service Ends E#ort to Eliminate Sale of Disposable Water Bottles, NAT’L PARK 
SERV. (Aug. $(, "#$*), https://www.nps.gov/orgs/$"#*/#)-$(-"#$*-water-bottles.htm 
[https://perma.cc/)'!Y-JBJS]. 
409 Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historical Park to Reopen After Grant from the Delta Airlines 
Foundation, DELTA NEWS HUB, https://news.delta.com/martin-luther-king-jr-national-historical-
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[https://perma.cc/LK)T-E!FR]. 
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select a park unit of concern to it, rather than to make a donation to the NPS 
to make a determination about which park units should be reopened, at least 
one scholar has argued that the opening reflected a private concern, rather than a 
necessarily public one.410 
Corporate gifts can have an impact on the decisions of government 
actors—to ban or not to ban plastic water bottles or to keep a site open that 
is of interest to the donor corporation. Lemos and Charles argue that even 
when “well-meaning citizens contribute their fortunes to support a vision of 
the public good—and where the immediate consequences seem, at worst, 
innocuous,” private +nancing of government remains a concern.411 If only 
major corporations like Delta and Coca-Cola, but not ordinary citizens, can 
in/uence NPS decisions in a concrete way, then we should be concerned 
about an erosion of democratic legitimacy, as well as distributive justice 
considerations in these relationships between corporations and the 
government.412 It is arguably less problematic if such sponsorship goes to 
support existing programs de+ned by the NPS or Park Superintendents, 
much as it is less problematic when the NPS writes the terms of a bid for a 
concession contract. The key point is that the risk of co-optation is higher, 
and the legitimacy de+cit increases, when corporate activity within the parks 
spells an erosion of public decision making authority and control. 
b.	 Associative Risk 
A second potential harm to the parks is associative risk. The concern is 
that negative publicity about the corporate sponsor will tarnish the reputation 
of the public sector or non-pro+t recipient of the sponsorship.413 Pontikes, 
Negro and Rao addressed this type of risk in their study of the impact of 
“stigma by association” on artists who had worked with blacklisted artists in 
Hollywood during the “red scare.”414 They found that when an artist’s co-
worker was blacklisted, the artist’s chances of working again in a feature +lm 
 
410 Jon D. Michaels, Essay, We the Shareholders: Government Market Participation in the Postliberal 
U.S. Political Economy, $"# COLUM. L. REV. &(', &%) ("#"#). 
411 Lemos & Charles, supra note !(, at $$!'. 
412 Id., at $$)$ (raising an objection to gifts from wealthy individuals based on the norm of 
“equal political citizenship”). The authors note, however, that gifts to public parks tend to be more 
redistributive in nature than ordinary philanthropic gifts by individuals to government entities 
(which tend not to be redistributive, on average). Id. at $$)& (“Even if located in an exclusive 
neighborhood . . . a public park is still open to the public.”). 
413 Mowen, Kyle & Jackowski, supra note !!), at %(. 
414 Elizabeth Pontikes, Giacomo Negro & Hayagreeva Rao, Stained Red: A Study of Stigma by 
Association to Blacklisted Artists During the ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood, !$%" to !$&', *' AM. SOCIOL. REV. 
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were reduced, even after a single association with that co-worker.415 
McDonnell and Werner applied the concept of “associative risk” or “stigma-
by-association” to corporations and their a.liates in a recent study, which 
found that corporations targeted by boycotts created an “associative risk” for 
politicians who were the recipients of the +rms’ corporate political activity.416 
They de+ned “associative risk” as the “perceived likelihood of accruing 
incidental damage by virtue of their mere association with a reputationally 
compromised organization.”417 
Associative risk increased when a corporation subject to boycotts had 
donated to a politician. In such cases, politicians were signi+cantly more 
likely to refund campaign contributions from boycotted +rms than from non-
boycotted +rms.418 In addition, corporate o.cers from boycotted +rms were 
signi+cantly less likely to be invited to participate in congressional hearings 
than o.cers from non-boycotted +rms and boycotted +rms were signi+cantly 
less likely to be awarded government procurement contracts than non-
boycotted +rms.419 
While McDonnell and Werner’s study focused on the associative risk and 
subsequent e,orts of elected o.cials to distance themselves from targeted 
+rms,420 other stakeholder groups can su,er reputational harm when 
associated with a +rm whose reputation has been tarnished. For example, 
many museums, including the Metropolitan Museum of Art, have stated that 
they will no longer accept gifts from the Sackler family, whose +rm, Purdue 
Pharma, manufactured and sold the opioid OxyContin, which has caused 
devastating e,ects in the opioid crisis.421 Many universities have likewise 
been “tainted” by their association with sexual predator Je,rey Epstein, who 
donated millions to schools including Harvard, MIT, and others in an e,ort 
to burnish his own reputation.422 
 
415 Id. at &'(-'*. While their study focused on the red scare, the authors note that the 
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Likewise, if a major corporation were to engage in a public cause-related 
marketing campaign with the national parks, and then were subject to a 
serious corporate scandal, it is possible that the taint of the scandal would, by 
association, a,ect the parks and the public goodwill that the NPS has built 
up over more than #** years. For this reason, perhaps, regulations and 
guidance governing philanthropy to the parks prohibit donations from 
tobacco +rms and the proceeds of illegal activity. But in the context of the 
national parks, it may be the case that an associative taint arises out of the 
mere fact that a corporate sponsor is a private entity rather than the public 
itself. This area is worthy of additional empirical research. 
c.	 Erosion in Support for Public Funds 
A third potential harm to the parks’ publicness is that private sponsorship, 
pro+ts from concessions, and cause-related marketing will erode support for 
public funding of public entities.423 This issue of concern arises not only in 
the context of the national parks, but also in the broader context of private 
philanthropy from individuals and foundations to fund health care, education, 
museums, drug treatment programs, and other community development 
programs.424 The concern is that the public may be less interested in public 
funding for programs if they think the private funding is su.cient, or they 
may simply not perceive the government to need funding because it appears 




423 Mowen, Kyle & Jackowski, supra note !!), at %*. Indeed, in the early years, very little was 
appropriated for park budgets, with the thought that visitor fees and private concessions would be sufficient 
in lieu of public funds. 
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David Rubenstein’s /*.' million gift to the NPS to +x a crack in the Washington Monument, and 
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This narrative raises an empirical question. Empirically, is it in fact true 
that corporate giving to national parks erodes support for public spending on 
the parks? It is also possible that corporate philanthropy can increase support 
for public funding, or is neutral and has no e,ect. This question is capable of 
empirical testing. While this hypothesis that private funding will crowd out 
public funding appears frequently in legal scholarship, there appears to be 
little empirical evidence on this precise question.  
However, several studies have examined an analogous issue: whether 
private environmental governance—private actions by +rms or industries to 
engage in pro-environmental behavior426—has any e,ect on support for 
public environmental law or regulation. For example, several scholars recently 
found that widespread industry adoption by corporations of private 
environmental governance (a commitment to use recycled content in 
packaging, or to manufacture vehicles with high fuel e.ciency) signi+cantly 
reduced support among environmental activists, members of the public, and 
government o.cials for public regulation on the same issues.427 In contrast, 
one working paper has found positive, rather than negative, spillover e,ects 
toward support for public climate policy when participants learn about 
private e,orts to mitigate climate change.428 The authors found that when 
participants learned about private climate governance initiatives by 
corporations, conservatives and moderates were more supportive of public 
climate mitigation policies rather than less supportive.429 A third recent study 
found that private corporate environmental governance “can increase public 
support for legislation,” but that the e,ect is likewise focused in moderate 
and conservative members of the public, who are more likely to trust 
corporations as credible sources than more liberal members of the public.430 
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This study posits that corporate action leads more conservative members of 
the public to believe that a problem actually exists and is not illusory.431 
These studies tested whether private environmental governance by 
corporations erodes or increases support for public policy or regulation. Thus, 
testing whether corporate philanthropy reduces or increases support for 
public funding is likewise possible. Such testing could be conducted through 
surveys, where participants are exposed to information about private funding 
for the parks and asked their views on public +nancial support for the 
parks.432 
Notably, however, there is one data point to contradict this negative 
spillover hypothesis. In July, (*(*, Congress presented to the President for 
signature the Great American Outdoors Act.433 On August ", (*(*, the 
President signed the Act into law.434 Passed by overwhelming bipartisan 
majorities in both the House (!#* to #*)) and Senate ()! to ('),435 the law will 
provide up to -%.' billion over +ve years in a trust fund to address the 
maintenance backlog at the national parks.436 
Thus, it remains important to acknowledge the possibility that private 
funding can have both positive and negative spillover e,ects on support for 
public funding of the parks. The direction and magnitude of that e,ect are 
capable of empirical testing and are worthy of further study. 
d. Exclusion of the Public 
Finally, a fourth potential harm can arise in extreme circumstances—
exclusion. A well-publicized example of Pepsi’s and the NFL’s corporate 
 
Walmart, Starbucks, Kohl’s, Walgreens, Publix, Target, and CVS that masks are required during the 
COVID-$% crisis. Bill Saporito, Meet the New C.D.C. Director: Walmart, N.Y. TIMES (July "&, "#"#), 
https://www.nytimes.com/"#"#/#*/"&/opinion/walmart-coronavirus-masks.html 
[https://perma.cc/KF*X-YY%*]. 
431 Dana & Nadler, supra note &!#, at *". 
432 In one study, Elke Weber found that farmers who act to mitigate climate change “become 
less concerned about the overall e-ects of climate change,” even if their actions have no appreciable 
impact on risk reduction. MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND 
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE %! (explaining 
Weber’s study and discussing possible negative spillover e-ects of private climate mitigation on 
support for government climate mitigation) (citing Elke U. Weber, Perception and Expectation of 
Climate Change: Precondition for Economic and Technological Adaptation, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, 
AND BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION AND DEGRADATION !$& 
(Max H. Bazerman, David M. Messick, Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni eds., $%%*). 
433 Actions Overview H.R. !$". – !!&th Congress (-'!$--'-'), CONG., 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/$$(th-congress/house-bill/$%'*/actions [https://perma.cc/HF)'-
NQE)]; see S. !&"", $$(th Cong. ("#"#) (enacted). 
434 Great American Outdoors Act, Pub. L. No. $$(-$'", § "##&#" $! Stat. ()", ()!-)( ("#"#) 
(codi+ed at '& U.S.C. § "##&#$). 
435 Actions Overview H.R. !$". – !!&th Congress (-'!$--'-'), supra note &!!. 
436 § "##&#", $! Stat. at ()!-)( ("#"#). 
(*(*] National Parks, Incorporated #*' 
sponsorship of an event at the National Mall generated significant criticism, 
leading to a change in the law to prevent such exclusion from the Mall in the 
future. This example is important because it highlights the recognition by the 
NPS that exclusion of the public can—but should not—happen as a result of 
corporate activity. However, while the law now prohibits such exclusion on the 
Mall, it remains possible that such exclusion could occur elsewhere. 
In (**!, the National Football League (NFL) was authorized to use the 
National Mall in Washington, D.C. (which is a unit of the National Park 
System) for its annual season kicko, event.437 The NFL sought additional 
corporate sponsors for the event, and PepsiCo contributed -(.' million to 
what ultimately became known as “NFL Kicko, Live (**! From the National 
Mall Presented by Pepsi Vanilla.”438 The event included a concert headlined 
by Britney Spears.439 In the week leading up to the event, members of the 
public could not access the Mall because of the “stage, fencing, Jumbotrons, 
giant tents and signs,” including banners promoting Pepsi Vanilla.440 Two 
weeks later, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the use of federal funds 
for events on the National Mall unless the permit prohibits the “erection, 
placement, or use of structures and signs bearing commercial advertising” on 
the Mall.441 While acknowledgement of event sponsors is permitted, such 
recognition “shall be consistent with the special nature and sanctity of the 
Mall” and letters may not be larger than a de+ned size.442 
While perhaps such exclusion is less likely in the more spacious settings 
of national parks than on the National Mall, and thus the legislation focused 
on the Mall in Congress’s backyard, it remains the case that non-extractive 
corporate activity like cause-related marketing can, in extreme cases, result in 
the exclusion of the public. 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This +nal section concludes that the NPS should not be complacent about 
the risks of harm that arose in the parks’ early years—exclusion of the public, 
the removal or extraction of commodities for sale in markets, and the parks’ 
physical destruction. However, the associative and expressive harms to the 
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parks that can arise from the non-extractive relationships with corporations 
that this Article has identi+ed deserve greater attention, both in scholarship 
and policy. For example, more empirical scholarship is needed to determine 
whether corporate donations lead members of the public to be more or less 
supportive of public funding for the parks. Likewise, more empirical work 
could determine whether mere association of the parks with private corporate 
donors or concessioners—even with +rms untainted by scandal—exposes the 
parks to stigma-by-association. 
With respect to park governance and policy, a nuanced approach must 
take into account not only the tangible consequences of such relationships—
both good and bad—but intangible ones as well. With respect to tangible 
harms, as the above discussion re/ects, early promoters of public parks argued 
that if private interests were permitted to encroach on the publicness of the 
parks, even small private interests could ultimately destroy the parks 
themselves.443 They did not wish to allow the parks to turn into another over-
commercialized Niagara Falls.444 While expressed in di,erent forms, these 
concerns about private ownership of natural wonders generally echoed the 
ways in which we traditionally think about the bundle of sticks that makes up 
private property, including concerns about exclusion and destruction that 
dramatically unfolded in the early years and motivated the creation of the 
parks and limits on private action. 
Some expressed the fear that private ownership of natural wonders would 
permit the physical exclusion of members of the public from enjoying them. 
Others were concerned that private ownership of nearby property or access 
routes would permit private interests to charge entry fees that would limit 
access. With respect to destruction, early experiences with development in 
the Yosemite Valley led to concerns that private interests would physically 
remove assets, like timber, from the parks, or that private interests would 
physically destroy the lands, as in the case of over-grazing. Even in the 
absence of tolls and fees, the public cannot enjoy these natural wonders if 
they no longer exist. The laws and regulations adopted by Congress and the 
NPS demonstrate generally adequate responses to these early concerns. They 
limit development, impose limits on private concessions to those that are 
“necessary and appropriate,” and negate private claims to natural wonders like 
Yellowstone’s geysers themselves. 
But there has been, and there remains some role for private corporate 
action within the parks, even if that role is necessarily limited. Such private 
activity undoubtedly includes private concessions, and some private 
philanthropic support, including cause-related marketing. These forms of 
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corporate activity do not implicate the core concerns about exclusion, 
commodi+cation, and destruction that have long motivated park governance. 
Whether the Ahwahnee Hotel retains its historic name or is renamed the 
Historic Yosemite Lodge does not prevent visitors to Yosemite from staying 
in its rooms. And corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing 
arguably have the potential to help the national parks by providing funds to 
maintain trails, improve the quality of ranger stations, or do other needed 
maintenance. In other words, not only do these forms of corporate action not 
implicate exclusion or the right to destroy, the exact opposite may be true. 
Accommodations provide access. And funding can support trail maintenance. 
Funding can also support access for underserved or disadvantaged groups. So 
how should park governance accommodate or even encourage the more 
positive aspects of these relationships while guarding against their potential 
drawbacks? 
One approach might be to suggest that corporate relationships with and 
sponsorship of the parks could be harnessed to combat the harms of exclusion 
and destruction that are core to the publicness of the parks. For example, if 
private donations were significant, the parks could potentially waive entrance 
fees for some or all visitors. Private corporate concessioners could likewise 
reduce fees or adopt a sliding scale of fees to encourage visits from underserved 
members of the community. Such benefits could be required as features of 
concession contracts, rather than merely adopted through private generosity. 
Such a requirement would go a step further to promote public access to the parks 
than the provision added during the trademark dispute that essentially prohibits 
concessioners from seeking to trademark the historic names of park amenities.  
But valuing these potentially positive consequences of corporate action 
should not come at the expense of acknowledging intangible harms. For 
example, even when corporate funding or concessions can improve access to 
the parks, these relationships nonetheless raise concerns that they are 
promoting some degree of private control or co-optation. Whether this is 
control of the governance agenda, or control of space, the concern is that 
private corporate activity within the parks may diminish (or appear to 
diminish) control by the public agency and its o.cials who have a 
responsibility to act in the public interest. To address this concern about co-
optation, perhaps the law should not only restrict naming rights within the 
parks, but also make clear that decisions about how the donated money is to 
be spent must be determined, +rst and foremost, by the NPS, local park 
superintendents, or equivalent state o.cials. One way to do this would be to 
require the NPF to seek donations for particular, existing programs, rather 
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than to accept funds designated for programs of interest to the sponsors.445 
Another option would be to follow the example set by Michigan, in which 
members of the public can vote on which of several programs should receive 
the private contributions. Alternatively, all funding could simply be donated 
to support the general NPS account, rather than to be earmarked for special 
programs. 
Regardless of whether corporate activity promotes bene+cial 
consequences—such as increased visits among communities that have 
previously been unable to access the parks—private corporate activity also 
raises expressive, intangible concerns. The legal rules governing the parks 
must likewise take these expressive considerations into account. For example, 
as Sax, Rose, and the Supreme Court have all suggested, public funding for 
parks and monuments express something about our nation’s collective 
commitments.446 The corollary to this view is that private funding itself can 
undermine this expression of a national commitment to these treasures—
regardless of the consequences on support for public funding. At a more 
abstract level, therefore, these relationships raise the question of whether 
corporate association with the parks dilutes their status as symbols of the 
nation and their role in civic nation-building.447 By associating with these 
popular parks, corporations undoubtedly bene+t. But if the parks receive 
funds from corporate, rather than public, sources they could lose their 
expressive value in demonstrating the public commitment toward preserving 
places of wonder and awe. As noted above, even when individuals do not 
themselves visit the parks, they nonetheless derive bene+ts from knowing 
that such places exist. As the Supreme Court pointed out in the Gettysburg 
case, the fact that the government was setting aside land to commemorate the 
Battle at Gettysburg was itself meaningful, as evidence of a public 
commitment to the history of the nation. 
Keeping these normative principles in mind, perhaps the best way to 
conceptualize the dispute over the trademark to the name of the historic 
hotels and properties within Yosemite National Park, despite its non-
extractive nature, is that it too, was an e,ort to stake out a private “claim” to 
a wonder within the parks. Not a natural wonder, the Ahwahnee Hotel (and 
the other landmarked features) had become so intertwined with the goodwill 
of the parks that they came to be understood by the public as part of what the 
parks are. And perhaps the best way to conceptualize the issue of 
philanthropy and cause-related marketing is that, even though they are non-
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extractive in nature, they nonetheless allow private +rms to remove some 
aspect of goodwill from the public domain by making these national symbols 
more closely associated with private sponsors. In other words, park managers 
and regulators ought to be concerned about these intangible risks of harm to 
the parks, including co-optation, stigma-by-association, negative spillovers 
with respect to public funding, and the potential (in extreme cases) for 
corporate activity to exclude, rather than to include, members of the public. 
This Article has offered several suggestions to think about how to address 
the implications of these new and old corporate relationships with the parks. 
Most importantly, the Article has identified how these relationships, though 
not traditionally “extractive” in the sense of taking something physical out of 
the parks, may in fact be extractive in an intangible sense. While the 
suggestions offered here are preliminary, the goal is to begin a discussion to 
rethink these relationships. We would do well to remind ourselves that even 
those relationships that do not extract physical commodities or exclude the 
public can nonetheless erode public goodwill. And scholars and policymakers 
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